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1.Introduction:	  
Section	  197	  of	  the	  Labour	  Relations	  Act1	  has	  had	  a	  drastic	  impact	  on	  the	  way	  in	  
which	   businesses	   interact	   and	   transact	   in	   the	   South	   African	   economic	   climate.	  
The	  section	  deals	  with	  the	  transfer	  of	  businesses	  as	  a	  going	  concern.	  It	  purports	  
to	  safeguard	  the	  interests	  of	  employees	  by	  ensuring	  their	  automatic	  transfer	  to	  a	  
new	   employer	   upon	   meeting	   the	   required	   elements. 2 	  Mergers,	   acquisitions,	  
outsourcing	   and	   secondary	   outsourcing	   transactions	   have	   all	   been	   held	   to	   fall	  
within	  its	  scope.	  Due	  to	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  effects	  that	  the	  application	  of	  the	  
section	  will	  have	  on	  the	  enterprise	  of	  a	  possible	  transferee,	  businesses	  have	  tried	  
to	   structure	   their	   transactions	   in	   such	   a	   way	   so	   as	   to	   evade	   and	   avoid	   the	  
application	   of	   section	   197.	   This	   has	   prompted	   the	   courts	   to	   scrutinise	   such	  
transactions	   carefully	   in	   order	   to	   get	   to	   the	   core	   and	   substance	   of	   such	  
transactions.	   It	   is	   of	   utmost	   importance	   to	   determine	   what	   the	   transaction	  
consists	  of	  at	  its	  core	  so	  as	  to	  provide	  protection	  to	  employees	  from	  dealings	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  their	  employers	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  attempts	  are	  made	  to	  dispose	  of	  the	  
workforce	  by	  structuring	  the	  transaction	  outside	  the	  provisions	  of	  section	  197.	  	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  requirements	  necessary	  to	  trigger	  the	  application	  of	  section	  197	  
have	   been	   defined	   in	   broad	   terms	   have	   left	   the	   courts	   with	   somewhat	   of	   a	  
discretion	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   section.	   The	   courts	   have	  
however	   not	   been	   left	   to	   their	   own	   devices	   but	   have	   rather	   been	   requested	   to	  
flesh	   out	   the	   requirements	   of	   section	   197	   by	   having	   regard	   to	   its	   underlying	  
purpose	  when	  its	  provisions	  are	  to	  be	  interpreted.	  	  Through	  all	  of	  this	  the	  courts	  
have	   fared	   well	   in	   canvassing	   the	   purpose	   of	   section	   197;	   against	   which	   its	  
requirements	  are	  to	  be	  interpreted	  and	  applied.3	  	  
	  
A	   problem	   has	   however	   arisen	   that	   proposes	   to	   challenge	   the	   way	   in	   which	  
courts	  view	  and	  apply	  the	  objective	  of	  section	  197	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  requirements	  
contained	   therein.	   The	   mentioned	   problem	   refers	   to	   the	   situation	   in	   which	   a	  
franchise	   agreement	   between	   a	   franchisor	   and	   franchisee	   is	   terminated,	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Labour	  Relations	  Act	  66	  of	  1995.	  
2	  N	  Smit	  ‘Automatic	  Transfer	  of	  Employment	  Contracts	  and	  the	  Power	  to	  Object’	  
(2003)	  3	  Tydskrif	  vir	  die	  Suid-­‐Afrikaanse	  Reg	  465.	  
3	  L	  Biggs	  ‘The	  Application	  of	  Section	  197	  of	  The	  Labour	  Relations	  Act	  In	  An	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subsequent	  to	  the	  termination,	  the	  franchisor	  concludes	  a	  new	  agreement	  with	  a	  
new	   franchisee	   so	   as	   to	   transfer	   the	   franchise.	  Upon	   the	   occurrence	   of	   such	   an	  
event	  one	  is	  prompted	  to	  ask	  whether	  a	  business	  has	  been	  transferred	  as	  a	  going	  
concern	  and	  whether	  section	  197	  deserves	  to	  be	  applied.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Labour	  Appeal	  Court	  answered	  this	  question	  in	  the	  negative	  in	  the	  decision	  
between	   PE	   Pack	   4100	   CC	   v	   Sanders. 4As	   stated,	   the	   sparse	   content	   of	   the	  
definitional	  requirements	  contained	   in	  section	  197	  has	  placed	  a	  particular	  onus	  
on	  the	  courts	  to	  expound	  on	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  requirements	  by	  having	  regard	  
to	   the	  underlying	  purpose	  of	   the	   section.	   It	  will	  be	   contended	   that	   the	  court,	   in	  
this	  particular	  case,	  failed	  to	  interpret	  the	  requirements	  contained	  in	  section	  197	  
in	   accordance	   with	   its	   objective	   and	   purpose.	   It	   is	   further	   contended	   that	   the	  
question	   at	   hand	   stands	   to	   be	   answered	   in	   light	   of	   the	   jurisprudence	   that	  
surrounds	  the	  application	  of	  the	  section	  and	  its	  underlying	  objective	  and	  purpose.	  
	  
The	   content	   that	   is	   to	   follow	   will	   therefore	   be	   focused	   on	   franchising	   as	   a	  
business	   entity,	   the	   requirements	   contained	   in	   section	   197	   and	   the	   form	   of	  
legislative	   interpretation	   that	   courts	   have	   followed	   in	   order	   to	   discern	   the	  
objective	   and	  purpose	   of	   the	   particular	   provision.	   This	   framework	  will	   provide	  
context	   and	   serve	   as	   the	   backdrop	   against	   which	   the	   PE	   Pack	   case	   will	   be	  
discussed.	  Ultimately	  it	  will	  be	  asked	  whether	  section	  197	  allows	  a	  proprietor	  to	  
use	  a	  franchise	  as	  a	  vehicle	  whereupon	  it	  could	  load	  employees	  and	  dump	  them	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  (2013)	  4	  BLLR	  348	  (LAC).	  
5	  Aviation	  Union	  of	  SA	  on	  behalf	  of	  Barnes	  &	  Others	  v	  SA	  Airways	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  (2009)	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2.Franchising	  as	  a	  business:	  
2.1.Introduction:	  
In	   this	   chapter	   regard	   will	   be	   had	   to	   franchising	   as	   a	   business	   entity.	   This	  
discussion	  will	  include	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  nature,	  varieties,	  definitional	  elements,	  
underlying	   relationships,	   reasons	   for,	   and	   regulation	   of	   franchising	   in	   South	  
Africa.	  The	  South	  African	  legal	  system	  recognises	  franchising	  as	  a	  business	  entity	  
and	  regulates	  it	  with	  a	  combination	  of	  case	  law	  and	  legislation.	  6	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
embodiment	   of	   a	   franchise	   relationship	   within	   a	   commercial	   agreement,	   the	  
South	  African	   law	  of	  contract	  has	  a	   large	  role	  to	  play	  as	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	   the	  
mentioned	  relationship.7	  
2.1.1.	  Nature	  of	  Franchising:	  
A	   franchise	   agreement	   is	   a	   contract	   concluded	   between	   two	   parties,	   the	  
franchisor	   and	   the	   franchisee,	   wherein	   the	   franchisee	   acquires	   the	   right	   to	  
conduct	   its	  business	  within	  the	  pre-­‐established	  framework	  of	   the	  franchisor.	  By	  
virtue	   of	   this	   right	   the	   franchisee	  will	   earn	   the	   right	   to	   be	   associated	  with	   the	  
trade	   or	   service	   marks	   of	   the	   franchisor,	   and	   the	   franchisor	   will	   have	   the	  
concomitant	   right	   to	   receive	   remuneration	   or	   some	  monetary	   benefit	   from	   the	  
franchisee	  for	  the	  pleasures	  that	  the	  franchisee	  enjoys	  under	  the	  agreement.8This	  
benefit	  was	  succinctly	  described	  as	  a	  ‘royalty’	  in	  De	  Beer	  v	  Keyser.	  9	  The	  intention	  
of	  the	  parties	  will	  determine	  which	  rights	  and	  obligations	  should	  ensue	  from	  the	  
agreement.	  	  
	  
Both	   franchisors	   and	   franchisees	   could	   be	   either	   natural	   or	   juristic	   persons.	  
According	  to	  the	  agreement	  and	  intention	  of	  the	  parties,	  the	  franchisor	  may	  grant	  
a	   single	   unit,	   multi-­‐unit	   or	   master	   franchise	   to	   the	   franchisee.10	  A	   single	   unit	  
franchise	   will	   usually	   be	   owned	   and	   operated	   by	   a	   single	   franchisee.	  Where	   a	  
franchisee	  acquires	  the	  right	  to	  conduct	  a	  multi-­‐unit	  franchise,	  it	  will	  be	  entitled	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6With	   regards	   to	   legislation,	   the	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act	   treats	   franchisees	  as	  
consumers	   and	   will	   therefor	   play	   a	   regulatory	   role	   in	   relation	   to	   franchising.	  
Consumer	  Protection	  	  Act	  68	  of	  2008.	  
7	  T	  Woker	  The	  Franchise	  Relationship	  Under	  South	  African	  Law	  (2012).	  	  
8	  Woker(2012)	  op	  cit	   (n7).	  The	  relationship	  between	   franchisor	  and	   franchisee	  
cannot	  be	  classified	  as	  one	  of	  master	  and	  servant,	  see	  Longhorn	  Group	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  v	  
The	  Fedics	  Group	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  (1995)	  4	  All	  SA	  194	  (W).	  
9	  De	  Beer	  v	  Keyser	  (2002)	  1	  All	  SA	  368	  (A).	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to	   own	   and	   operate	   a	   number	   of	   establishments.	  Within	   the	   context	   of	  master	  
franchises,	   the	   franchisee	   will	   have	   control	   over	   a	   specified	   geographical	   area	  
wherein	  it	  will	  have	  the	  right	  to	  establish	  its	  own	  franchises	  or	  enter	  into	  direct	  
franchise	   agreements	   with	   sub-­‐franchisees.	   The	   duration	   of	   the	   franchise	  
agreement	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  parties.	  11Although	  the	  franchisee	  
will	  be	  buying	   its	  own	  independently	  owned	  business,	   it	  cannot	  expect	   to	  enjoy	  
the	   use	   of	   the	   franchisors	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   indefinitely.12	  Franchise	  
agreements	  are	  predominantly	  structured	  in	  two	  forms	  13namely;	  trade	  name	  or	  
product	  distribution	   franchises,	   and	  business	   format	   franchises.	  A	  discussion	  of	  
both	  forms	  will	  follow.	  	  
	  
2.1.1.1.	  Trade	  name	  or	  product	  distribution	  franchises:	  
Trade	  name	  or	  product	  distribution	  franchises	  occur	  when	  the	  franchisor	  grants	  
a	  non-­‐exclusive	  right	   to	  the	   franchisee	  to	  sell	  and	  distribute	  the	  products	  of	   the	  
franchisor	   and	   also	   to	   enjoy	   the	   right	   to	   use	   the	   franchisor’s	   trade	   or	   service	  
marks.14	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  parties	  is	  a	  limited	  one	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  franchisee	  operates	  it	  business	  within	   its	  own	  independent	  framework.	  As	  a	  
result	  of	  the	  limited	  scope	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  parties,	  the	  agreement	  
will	   usually	   be	   structured	   around	   the	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   of	   the	  
franchisor.15This	  is	  a	  popular	  mode	  of	  franchising	  for	  petroleum	  distributors	  and	  
soft	  drink	  manufacturers.	  Companies	   like	  Coke	  and	  Pepsi	  have	  made	  use	  of	   this	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  De	   Beer	   v	   Keyser	   supra	   (n9).	   Cash	   Converters	   Southern	   Africa	   (Pty)	   Ltd.	   v	  
Rosebud	  Western	  Province	  Franchise	  (Pty)	  Ltd.	  2001	  JOL	  8041	  (C).	  	  
12	  Woker	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  (n7).	  
13	  Woker	  	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  (n7).	  
14	  Williams	   	  v	  Natural	  Life	  Health	  Foods	  Ltd	  (1998)	  2	  All	  ER	  577.	  The	   franchisor	  
would	  be	  a	  product	  distributor	  while	  the	  franchisee	  will	  be	  a	  product	  retailer.	  
15	  T	  Woker	  ‘Establishing	  When	  A	  Franchise	  is	  Actually	  A	  Franchise	  –	  ‘If	  it	  Looks	  
Like	   A	   Duck,	   Smells	   Like	   A	   Duck	   And	   Quacks	   Like	   A	   Duck,	   it	   is	   Usually	   A	  
Duck’(2010)	   SA	   Mercantile	   Law	   Journal	   12.	   Also	   see	   Cancun	   Trading	   v	   Seven-­‐
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2.1.1.2.	  Business	  format	  franchising:	  
Business	   format	   franchising	   is	   more	   widely	   applied	   than	   product	   distribution	  
franchises	   and	   also	   provides	   a	   better	   platform	   for	   franchisors	   to	   protect	   their	  
trademarks.	   In	   this	   form	  of	   franchising	   the	   franchisee	  will	   conduct	   its	   business	  
within	   the	   well-­‐established	   framework	   of	   the	   franchisor	   and	   this	   will	   include:	  
access	   to	   the	   franchisor’s	   business	   know-­‐how,	   transfer	   of	   certain	   skills	   and	  
information,	   and	   on-­‐going	   training	   and	   support	   that	   will	   be	   provided	   by	   the	  
franchisor.	   16 This	   will	   invariably	   involve	   a	   close	   relationship	   between	   the	  
parties.17	  	  
	  
Included	  in	  this	  agreement	  will	  be	  an	  entitlement	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  franchisee	  to	  
use	  the	  trade,	  service	  marks	  and	  other	  intellectual	  property	  of	  the	  franchisor.	  In	  
return	  for	  this	  privilege,	  the	  franchisee	  will	  be	  required	  to	  make	  a	  payment	  to	  the	  
franchisor	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  royalty.	  The	  royalties	  will	  usually	  be	  calculated	  using	  
the	   gross	   monthly	   revenue	   of	   each	   franchise.18Examples	   of	   business	   format	  
franchises	   are	   fast	   food	   restaurants	   such	   as	   McDonald’s	   and	   Burger	   King	   and	  
convenience	  stores	  such	  as	  Pick	  ‘n	  Pay,	  Spar	  and	  Ch ckers.	  This	  relationship	  will	  
require	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  control	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  franchisor	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
fact	   that	   its	   assets	   will	   be	   exposed	   to	   risk	   to	   a	   greater	   degree	   that	   product	  
distribution	  franchises.19	  
2.1.2.Legislative	  Requirements:	  
As	   a	   result	   of	   the	   need	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   legislature	   to	   regulate	   franchising,	   a	  
definition	  is	  called	  for	  so	  as	  to	  bring	  those	  relationships	  that	  exhibit	  the	  necessary	  
characteristics	   into	   line	   with	   the	   applicable	   legislation.	   Woker20	  suggests	   that	  
franchising	  can	  be	  defined	  from	  two	  different	  perspectives.21	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  http://www.thebfa.org/about-­‐franchising-­‐key-­‐facts	  (Accessed	  on	  14	  March	  
2013).	  
17	  Woker	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  	  (n7).	  
18De	  Beer	  v	  Keyser	  supra	  (n9).	  
19	  T	  Woker	  ‘Franchising	  And	  Restraints	  of	  Trade-­‐Restraining	  Ex-­‐Franchisees	  
From	  Competing	  With	  The	  Franchise	  Network’	  (2005)	  26	  Obiter	  1.	  
20	  Woker	  (2012)	  	  op	  cit	  (n6).	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Firstly	  there	  is	  the	  business	  owner’s	  definition,	  which	  states	  that:	  	  
	  
“Franchising	   is	   a	   method	   of	   market	   expansion	   utilized	   by	   a	   successful	  
business	  entity	  wanting	  to	  expand	  its	  distribution	  of	  services	  through	  retail	  
entities	  owned	  by	  independent	  operators	  using	  the	  trade	  or	  service	  marks,	  
marketing	   techniques,	   and	   controls	   of	   the	   expanding	   business	   entity	   in	  
return	  for	  the	  payment	  of	  fees	  and	  royalties	  from	  the	  retail	  outlet.”22	  
	  
Secondly	   there	   is	   a	   definition	   of	   what	   the	   law	   considers	   to	   be	   a	   franchise.23	  In	  
order	   to	   discern	   the	   applicable	   legislative	   requirements	   regard	   will	   be	   had	   to	  
South	  African,	  American	  and	  English	  positions.	  
	  
The	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act	  68	  of	  2008	  defines	  a	  franchise	  as:	  
	  
“An	   agreement	   between	   two	   parties,	   being	   the	   franchisor	   and	   franchisee,	  
respectively-­‐	  
a) In	  which,	  for	  consideration	  paid,	  or	  to	  be	  paid,	  by	  the	  franchisee	  to	  
the	   franchisor,	   the	   franchisor	   grants	   the	   franchisee	   the	   right	   to	  
carry	  on	  business	  within	  the	  all	  or	  a	  specific	  part	  of	  the	  Republic	  
under	   a	   system	   or	   marketing	   plan	   substantially	   determined	   or	  
controlled	  by	  the	  franchisor	  or	  an	  associate	  of	  the	  franchisor;	  
b) Under	  which	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  business	  of	  the	  franchise	  will	  be	  
substantially	   or	   materially	   associated	   with	   the	   advertising	  
schemes	   or	   programs	   or	   one	   or	   more	   trade	   marks,	   commercial	  
symbols	  or	   logos	  or	  any	  similar	  marketing,	  branding,	   labeling	  or	  
devices,	   or	   any	   combination	   of	   such	   schemes,	   programs	   or	  
devices,	   that	   are	   conducted,	   owned,	   used	   or	   licensed	   by	   the	  
franchisor	  or	  an	  associate	  of	  the	  franchisor;	  
c) That	   governs	   the	   business	   relationship	   between	   the	   franchisor	  
and	   franchisee,	   including	   the	   relationship	   between	   them	   with	  
respect	   to	   the	  goods	  or	   services	   to	  be	   supplied	   to	   the	   franchisee	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Woker	  (2012)	  	  op	  cit	  (n7).	  	  
23	  This	  is	  known	  as	  the	  legal	  definition	  of	  franchising.	  










	   9	  
Although	  there	  is	  no	  statutory	  definition	  of	  a	  franchise	  in	  the	  UK,	  there	  is	  a	  code	  
of	  conduct	  wherein	  franchising	  is	  defined.25	  It	  defines	  franchising	  as	  follows:	  
	  
“Franchising	   is	   a	   system	   of	   marketing	   goods	   and/or	   services	   and/or	  
technology,	  which	  is	  based	  upon	  a	  close	  and	  ongoing	  collaboration	  between	  
legally	   and	   financially	   separate	   and	   independent	   undertakings,	   the	  
franchisor	   and	   its	   individual	   franchisees.	   The	   franchisor	   grants	   its	  
individual	   franchisees	   the	   right,	   and	   imposes	   the	   obligation,	   to	   conduct	   a	  
business	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  franchisor’s	  concept.	  The	  right	  entitles	  and	  
compels	   the	   individual	   franchisee,	   in	   exchange	   for	   a	   direct	   financial	  
consideration,	   to	   use	   the	   franchisor’s	   trade	   name,	   and/or	   trade	   mark	  
and/or	   service	   mark,	   know-­‐how,	   business	   and	   technical	   methods,	  
procedural	  system,	  and	  other	  industrial	  and/or	  intellectual	  property	  rights.	  	  
This	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  continuing	  provision	  of	  commercial	  and	  technical	  
assistance,	  within	   the	   framework	   and	   for	   the	   term	   of	   a	  written	   franchise	  
agreement,	  concluded	  between	  parties	  for	  this	  purpose.”26	  
	  
Similarly,	   the	   Federal	   and	   Trade	   Commission	   (FTC)	   of	   the	   United	   States	   of	  
America	   requires	   the	   presence	   of	   three	   essential	   elements	   in	   order	   for	   a	  
particular	  relationship	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  a	   franchis .27The	  three	  elements	  are:	  
The	   franchisor	  must	  give	   its	  permission	   to	   the	   franchisee	   to	  use	   it	   trademark;	  
secondly,	   the	   franchisor	  must	  exercise	  significant	  control	  over	   the	   franchisee’s	  
operation	  or	  must	  offer	  significant	  assistance	  to	  the	  franchisee;	  and	  thirdly,	  the	  
franchisee	  is	  required	  to	  make	  a	  payment	  to	  the	  franchisor.	  	  
	  
If	   the	   legal	   definitions	   of	   franchising	   are	   considered	   and	   compared,	   three	  
elements	   seem	   essential	   for	   a	   relationship	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   one	   of	  
franchising.	   As	   mentioned,	   these	   elements	   are:	   Firstly,	   there	   must	   be	   a	   close	  
relationship	   between	   the	   parties	   wherein	   the	   franchisor	   and	   the	   franchisee	  
collaborate	  within	  a	  specific	  business	  framework	  and	  which	  is	  normally	  dictated	  
by	  the	  franchisor	  who	  also	  exercises	  control	  over	  the	  relationship.	  Secondly,	  the	  
franchisor	  must	  allow	  the	  franchisee	  to	  use	  its	  trade,	  service	  or	  other	  marks	  and	  
entitle	   the	   franchisee	   to	   be	   associated	   with	   its	   advertising	   schemes	   or	   plans.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  The	  code	  of	  conduct	  is	  established	  by	  the	  British	  Franchise	  Association	  (BFA).	  
26	  http://www.thebfa.org/about-­‐bfa/code-­‐of-­‐ethics	  (Accessed	  on	  14	  March	  
2013).	  	  
27	  http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/01/R511003FranchiseRuleFRNotice.pdf	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Thirdly,	  the	  franchisee	  must	  compensate	  the	  franchisor	  for	  the	  privileges	  that	  it	  
has	  granted	  the	  franchisee.28	  
2.1.3.Why	  franchise?	  
In	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   understand	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   relationships	  within	   a	  
franchise,	   regard	   must	   be	   had	   to	   the	   policies	   and	   underlying	   reasons	   why	  
franchisors	   decide	   to	   use	   franchises	   as	   a	   method	   to	   expand	   their	   business	  
networks,	  and	  why	  franchisees	  decide	  to	  become	  part	  of	  this	  network.29	  
	  
	  Recent	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  independently	  owned	  start-­‐up	  business,	  when	  
compared	  to	  new	  franchises,	  have	  a	  higher	  rate	  of	  failure.30Couple	  this	  with	  the	  
fact	   that	   the	   franchisee	  will	  be	  plugging	   into	  a	  successful	  and	  proven	  business	  
model,	  the	  reason	  why	  someone	  might	  decide	  to	  buy	  a	  franchise	  becomes	  more	  
apparent.	  The	  fact	  that	  in	  some	  if	  not	  most	  of	  the	  business	  format	  franchises	  the	  
franchisee	  will	   receive	   financial,	   technical	   and	  management	   training	   from	   the	  
franchisor	  supports	  this	  statement.31	  	  
	  
The	  reason	  why	  a	  franchisor	  might	  insist	  on	  undertaking	  to	  train	  the	  franchisee	  
is	  to	  ensure	  the	  optimal	  success	  of	  the	  franchise,	  and	  essentially	  the	  network	  of	  
franchises.32This	   will	   be	   more	   prevalent	   in	   the	   context	   of	   business	   format	  
franchises.	   The	   interdependent	   and	   reciprocal	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Woker	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  (n7).	  	  
29	  Silent	  Pond	  Investments	  CC	  v	  Woolworths	  (Pty)	  (2007)	  JOL	  20088	  (D);	  2007	  JDR	  
0547	   (D).	   T	   Woker	   ‘The	   Franchise	   Relationship	   and	   the	   problem	   of	  
Encroachment:	   Silent	   Pond	   Investments	   CC	   v	   Woolworths	   (Pty)	   Ltd	   (2008)	   SA	  
Mercantile	  Law	  Journal	  	  402.	  
30	  The	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  estimated	  that	  95%	  of	  franchises	  succeed,	  
compared	  to	  only	  25-­‐35	  %	  of	  independently	  owned	  business.	  	  
31	  Pam	  Golding	  Franchise	  Services	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  v	  Douglas	  (1997)	  JOL	  378	  (D).	  
32	  http://www.franchising.com/articles/why_choose_franchising.html	  (Accessed	  
on	  14	  March	  2013).	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Financing	   may	   also	   prove	   to	   be	   easier	   for	   cash-­‐hungry	   franchisees	   when	  
considering	  buying	  a	  franchise	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  prospects	  of	  default	  on	  a	  
possible	  loan	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  a	  financier	  seeing	  the	  franchisee	  
is	  associating	  itself	  with	  a	  successful	  business	  model.34	  	  
	  
Business	   entities	   might	   choose	   to	   expand	   their	   market	   share	   or	   distribution	  
platforms	  by	  making	  use	  of	   the	   franchise	  business	  model.	   It	   is	   submitted	   that	  
franchising	  may	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  and	  leveraged	  ways	  that	  a	  business	  
and	  operation	  can	  be	  scaled.35	  Scalable	  businesses	  earn	  greater	  valuations	  due	  
to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  yield	  faster	  growth	  and	  greater	  profitability.	  By	  making	  use	  
of	  franchising,	  franchisors	  will	  gain	  access	  to	  capital	  without	  having	  to	  alter	  its	  
debt	   or	   equity	   structure.36	  Another	   obvious	   reason	  why	   businesses	   choose	   to	  
franchise	  a	  part	  of	  their	  operations	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  franchisor	  places	  
itself	  in	  a	  position	  to	  expand	  it’s	  business	  network	  without	  incurring	  any	  of	  the	  
risks	  associated	  with	  the	  proposed	  expansion.	  It	  is	  the	  franchisee	  that	  will	  bear	  
the	  risks	  in	  this	  particular	  instance.37	  
2.1.4.	  Relationship	  dynamics	  within	  the	  franchise	  framework:	  
It	   is	   inevitable	   that	   the	   discussion	   above	  will	   serve	   to	   inform	   the	   relationship	  
between	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  franchise	  agreement.	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  franchise	  
agreement,	  especially	  a	  business	  format	  franchise,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
parties	  is	  one	  of	  interdependence	  and	  intimacy.38If	  the	  franchisor	  is	  to	  maximize	  
its	   profitability	   it	   should	   ensure	   that	   the	   franchisee	   is	   adequately	   trained	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  http://www.franchising.com/articles/why_choose_franchising.html	  (Accessed	  
on	  14	  March	  2013).	  
35	  A	   scalable	   business	   implies	   possible	   economic	   growth	   of	   the	   business	   as	   a	  
result	  of	  the	  underlying	  business	  model.	  When	  resources	  are	  added	  to	  a	  system,	  
it	  could	  render	  a	  business	  capable	  of	  increasing	  it’s	  output.	  Franchises	  could	  add	  
to	   the	   resources	   of	   a	   business	   entity.	   http://enwikipedia.org/wiki/scalability	  
(Accessed	   on	   14	   March	   2013).	   The	   royalty	   payments	   serve	   as	   the	   vehicle	   in	  
terms	  whereof	  the	  franchisor	  will	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  low	  cost	  capital.	  
36Business	   entities	  might	   also	  prove	   to	   earn	  higher	  profits	  by	   franchising	   their	  
businesses,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   impetus	   by	   franchisee	   owned	   franchises.	   For	  
example,	  MacDonald’s	  franchises	  generate,	  on	  average,	  20%	  higher	  profits	  than	  
company-­‐owned	  
locationshttp://www.franchising.com/articles/why_choose_franchising.html	  
(Accessed	  on	  15	  March	  2013).	  
37 	  The	   risk	   mentioned	   relates	   to	   the	   possible	   failure	   of	   the	   newly	   opened	  
location.	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properly	  integrated	  into	  the	  franchisor’s	  business	  network.	  The	  franchisee	  must	  
ensure	   that	   it	   complies	   with	   the	   franchisor’s	   requests	   and	   take	   measures	   to	  
incorporate	   the	   franchisor’s	   training	   and	   business	   acumen	   into	   its	  
independently	  owned	  franchise.	  Because	  franchise	  agreements	  are	  an	  example	  
of	   a	   relational	   contract,	  39	  the	   parties	   to	   such	   long-­‐term	   contracts	   should	   not	  
frustrate	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  their	  respective	  obligations.40	  
	  
Because	  the	  franchisee	  makes	  a	  substantial	  investment	  by	  buying	  the	  franchise	  
it	   is	   placed	   in	   somewhat	   of	   a	   compromising	   position	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
protection	   of	   its	   investment	   lies	   partially	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   franchisor.41	  To	  
prevent	   its	   rights,	  under	   the	   franchise	  agreement,	   from	  being	   revoked	   it	  must	  
comply	   with	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   franchisor	   which	   might	   include	   paying	  
increased	  costs	  such	  as	   increased	  amounts	  of	  royalties	  and	  increased	  amounts	  
for	  advertising	  and	  marketing.	  	  
	  
Because	   the	   franchisor’s	   most	   valuable	   assets	   which	   is	   its	   trade,	   service	   and	  
other	   marks,	   and	   accompanying	   goodwill,	   form	   part	   and	   emanate	   from	   the	  
franchise	   agreement	   the	   franchisor	   must	   implement	   particular	   measures	   to	  
protect	   these	   assets.	   Franchise	   agreements	   are	   therefore	   structured	   in	   such	   a	  
way	  as	  to	  impose	  strict	  control	  over	  the	  franchisees.42	  	  
	  
The	  measures	  include,	  inter	  alia:	  controlling	  the	  franchise’s	  operating	  hours,	  the	  
quality	   of	   the	   products	   produced	   by	   the	   franchisees,	   the	   appearance	   of	   the	  
employees	   and	   the	   locations	  where	   the	   franchises	   are	   to	   be	   situated.43	  If	   one	  
accepts	   that	   franchisors	   want	   to	   maximize	   the	   profits	   of	   their	   business	  
networks,	   including	   their	   franchise	   networks,	   it	  makes	   sense	   that	   franchisors	  
would	   want	   to	   incorporate	   requirements	   regarding	   auditing,	   financial	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  A	  relational	  contract	   is	  one	  which	  requires	  an	  on-­‐going	  relationship	  between	  
the	  parties.	  L	  Hawthorne	   ‘The	  First	  Traces	  of	  Relational	  Contract	  Theory	  –	  The	  
Implicit	  Dimension	  of	  Co-­‐operation’	  (2007)	  19	  SA	  Mercantile	  Law	  Journal	  242.	  
40	  Hawthorne	  (2007)	  op	  cit	  (n39).	  
41	  Woker(2012)	  op	  cit	  (n7),	  also	  see	  Woker	  (2005)	  op	  cit	  (n21).	  
42	  T	  Woker	  ‘Understanding	  The	  Relationship	  between	  Franchising	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  
Competition’	  (2006)	  SA	  Mercantile	  Law	  Journal	  	  110.	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reporting	   procedures	   into	   their	   franchise	   agreements.	  44It	   is	   submitted	   that	  
franchise	  agreements	   should	  be	  uniform	  and	   that	  no	  deviation	   from	   this	   form	  
should	   be	   allowed.	   This	   is	   to	   protect	   the	   chain	   of	   franchises	   within	   the	  
franchisors	   network.	   In	   the	   judgment	   of	   Silent	   Pond	   Investments	   CC	   v	  
Woolworths	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  and	  another45this	  was	  confirmed.	  Here	  the	  court	  described	  
the	   franchisors’	   master	   agreement	   as	   one	   founded	   upon	   a	   take-­‐it-­‐or-­‐leave	   it	  
basis.	   The	   personal	   desires	   and	   any	   requests	   that	   potential	   franchisees	  might	  
have	  will	  therefore	  not	  be	  considered	  when	  entering	  into	  the	  agreement.46	  	  
2.1.5.Termination	  of	  the	  franchise	  agreement:	  
The	  termination	  of	  a	  franchise	  agreement	  could	  result	  in	  the	  happening	  of	  a	  host	  
of	  consequences.	  Restraints	  of	   trade	  and	  the	  application	  of	   transfer	  provisions	  
of	  various	  legislative	  sections	  loom	  large	  at	  this	  particular	  stage.47	  
	  
A	  franchise	  differs	  from	  an	  independently	  owned	  business	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  
intellectual	  property,	  business	  know-­‐how,	  advertising	  and	  any	  possible	  patents	  
belong	   to	   the	   franchisor	   and	   is	   not	   owned	   by	   the	   franchisee	   in	   relation	   to	   its	  
independently	   owned	   business.	  48This	   is	   evidenced	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   once	   the	  
franchise	  agreement	  is	  terminated	  the	  franchisee	  loses	  the	  right	  to	  use,	  or	  to	  be	  
associated	  with	  the	  mentioned	  intellectual	  property	  provided	  by	  the	  franchisor.	  
In	  order	  to	  protect	   their	   interests,	   franchisors	  will	  usually	  restrain	   franchisees	  
from	  pursuing	  a	   similar	   trade	   for	  a	  duration	  subsequent	   to	   the	   termination	  of	  
the	   agreement.	   A	   problem	   exists	   as	   to	   the	   goodwill	   of	   the	   franchise.	   The	  
substance	  of	  the	  question	  relates	  to	  whom	  the	  goodwill	  belongs,	  the	  franchisor	  
or	   the	   franchisee.	   A	   case	   can	   be	   made	   out	   for	   either	   party	   seeing	   as	   the	  
franchisee	   provides	   capital	   in	   order	   to	   start	   and	   run	   the	   business,	   while	   the	  
franchisor	  provides	  the	  required	  know-­‐how	  and	  forms	  of	   intellectual	  property	  
around	  which	  the	  business	  will	  be	  structured.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Woker	  	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  (n7).	  
45	  Supra	  (n29).	  
46	  No	  negotiation	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  form	  and	  substance	  of	  the	  agreement	  will	  
be	  allowed.	  Such	  measures	  will	  serve	  to	  protect	  the	  franchisor’s	  entire	  franchise	  
network	  from	  prejudice	  in	  those	  instances	  where	  a	  deviation	  from	  the	  standard	  
form	  is	  allowed.	  
47 See	   M	   Gouws	   ‘The	   Injunction	   against	   vertical	   restraints	   in	   franchise	  
agreements	  under	  The	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act’	  (2010)	  504	  De	  Rebus	  32.	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The	   South	   African	   courts	   have	   been	   divided	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   whether	   the	  
goodwill	  of	  the	  independently	  owned	  franchise	  accrues	  to	  the	  franchisor	  or	  the	  
franchisee.	  In	  Tamarillo	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  v	  BN	  Aitken	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  49	  the	  court	  held	  that	  the	  
goodwill	   is	   designed	   to	  protect	   the	   trademarks	  of	   the	   franchisor	   and	   that	   any	  
goodwill	  built	  up	  by	  the	  franchisee	  will	  become	  the	  property	  of	  the	  franchisor	  or	  
any	   new	   subsequent	   franchisee.	  Woker50	  contends	   that	   this	   question	  must	   be	  
addressed	  by	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  business	  of	  the	  franchisor;	  namely	  the	  selling	  
of	  franchisees.	  If	  one	  takes	  the	  perspective	  from	  a	  franchisors	  point	  of	  view,	  this	  
judgment	  appears	  to	  be	  correct.	  The	   franchise	  network	   is	  structured	   in	  such	  a	  
way	   that	   the	   goodwill	   created	   by	   a	   franchisee	   in	   one	   location	   may	   prompt	  
consumers	   to	   frequent	   the	   franchise	   of	   a	   different	   franchisee	   in	   a	   different	  
location.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  franchisees	  work	  together	  to	  generate	  goodwill	  for	  all	  
the	  franchisees	  that	  form	  part	  of	  the	  network	  under	  the	  umbrella	  provided	  for	  
by	  the	  franchisor	  with	  its	  business	  method	  and	  intangible	  assets.51	  
	  
The	   judgment	   in	  U-­‐Drive	  Franchise	  Systems	  Ltd	  v	  Drive	  Yourself	  Ltd52	  stands	   in	  
contrast	  to	  the	  Tamarillo	  decision.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  court	  held	  that	  the	  customer	  
connections	   that	   the	   franchisee	   had	   built	   up	   did	   not	   belong	   to	   the	   franchisor,	  
although	   the	   court	   recognized	   the	   right	   of	   protection	   that	   the	   franchisor’s	  
trademarks	  enjoyed.	  
	  
Franchisees	   are	   usually	   restricted	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   permissibility	   of	  
transferring	  their	  independently	  owned	  franchises.53	  Because	  the	  success	  of	  the	  
franchisor’s	  business	  network	  relies	  upon	  the	  franchise	  network	  as	  a	  whole	  it	  is	  
submitted	  that	  this	  practice	  is	  permissible.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  1982	  (1)	  SA	  398	  (A).	  
50	  Woker	  (2005)	  op	  cit	  (n19).	  
51	  Woker	  (2005)op	  cit	  (n19).	  
52	  1976	   (1)	   SA	   137	   (D),	   Randeree	   &	   others	   v	   Belrex	   647	   CC	   (2010)	   JOL	   25376	  
(KZD).	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The	   franchisee	  will	   be	   restricted	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	  will	   only	  be	  permitted	   to	  
transfer	  the	  business	  to	  a	  specified	  person	  or	  entity.	  Such	  terms	  and	  restrictions	  
will	  usually	  be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  franchise	  agreements	  by	  the	  franchisor.	  54	  
	  
A	  matter	  that	  deserves	  particular	  mention	  pertains	  to	  the	  business	  know-­‐how	  of	  
the	  franchisor	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  franchise	  agreement	  with	  
regard	  thereto.	  The	  business	  method	  advocated	  by	  the	  franchisor	  forms	  part	  of	  
the	  franchisor’s	  intellectual	  property.55In	  order	  to	  protect	  their	  property	  rights,	  
franchisors	   introduce	  measures	   known	   as	   restraint	   of	   trade	   clauses	   into	   their	  
franchisee	  agreements.	  Restraint	  of	   trade	  clauses	  serve	   to	  prevent	  contracting	  
parties	   from	   undertaking	   a	   particular	   career,	   business	   or	   trade.56As	   stated,	  
franchisors	  will	  use	  such	  clauses	   to	  protect	   their	   interests,	  whether	   it	  be	   their	  
intellectual	  property	  rights	  or	  franchise	  networks.	  
	  
In	  Magna	  Alloys	  and	  Research	  (SA)	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  v	  Ellis	  57the	  court	  found	  restraint	  of	  
trade	   clauses	   to	   be	   valid	   and	   enforceable.	   Restraint	   of	   trade	   clauses	   can	   be	  
classified	  into	  two	  forms:	  	  
	  
“(1)	  restraints	  that	  restrict	  franchisees	  from	  engaging	  in	  a	  similar	  trade,	  business	  or	  
occupation	   that	   will	   compete	   with	   the	   franchise	   during	   the	   relationship,	   also	  
referred	  to	  as	   in-­‐term	  non-­‐competition	  restraints;	  and	  (2)	  restraints	  restricting	  the	  
franchisee	   from	   competing	   with	   the	   network	   for	   a	   period	   of	   time	   after	   their	  
contracts	  are	  terminated,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  post-­‐term	  non-­‐competing	  restraints.”58	  
	  
The	   nature	   of	   post-­‐term	   non-­‐competing	   restraints	   is	   such	   as	   to	   preclude	   the	  
franchisee	  from	  entering	  the	  same	  field	  of	  enterprise	  as	  which	  it	  is	  familiar	  with	  
after	   the	   termination	   of	   the	   franchise	   agreement.59	  This	   exclusion	   from	   the	  
economy	  could	  prove	  to	  be	  problematic	  from	  a	  franchisee’s	  point	  of	  view.60That	  
is	  the	  reason	  why	  courts	  have	  made	  it	  onerous	  for	  franchisors	  to	  enforce	  such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Woker	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  (n7).	  
55	  Klopper	  Law	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  in	  South	  Africa	  (2011).	  
56	  Hutchison	  The	  Law	  of	  Contract	  in	  South	  Africa	  (2009).	  
57	  1984(4)	  SA	  874	  (A).	  
58	  Woker	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  (n7).	  
59	  Kwik	  Kopy	  (SA)	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  v	  Van	  Haarlem	  (1998)	  All	  SA	  362(W).	  
60	  The	   franchise	   agreement	  will	   be	   terminated,	   and	   the	   franchisees	  will	   not	   be	  
entitled	   to	   participate	   in	   a	   similar	   field	   of	   the	   economy	   with	   regards	   to	   the	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restraints.	   Before	   a	   court	   will	   find	   a	   restraint	   to	   be	   enforceable	   a	   franchisor	  
would	   have	   to	   prove	   that	   it	   has	   a	   protectable	   interest.	  Woker61	  argues	   that	   a	  
franchisor	  will	  able	  to	  invoke	  such	  a	  clause	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  goodwill	  of	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3.	  The	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  LRA:	  
At	  this	  stage	  it	  would	  be	  prudent	  to	  give	  an	  account,	  albeit	  briefly,	  of	  some	  of	  the	  
theories	   that	   surround	   the	   interpretation	  of	   statutes.	  This	  account	  will	   serve	   to	  
inform	   the	   discussion	   of	   how	   the	   courts	   have	   gone	   about	   in	   interpreting	   and	  
applying	   the	   requirements	   contained	   in	   section	   197.	   The	   two	   approaches	   that	  
will	   be	   contrasted	   will	   be	   the	   literal	   and	   purposive	   approach	   to	   statutory	  
interpretation.	  
	  
The	   literal,	   text	   based	  approach	   to	   statutory	   interpretation	  holds	   that	   the	  plain	  
meaning	   be	   given	   to	   the	   provision	   subject	   to	   interpretation.62	  Only	   if	   the	   plain	  
meaning	   of	   the	   words	   are	   ambiguous,	   vague	   or	   misleading	   or	   if	   such	   an	  
interpretation	   would	   lead	   to	   an	   absurd	   result	   may	   the	   court	   deviate	   from	   the	  
plain	  meaning.63A	  criticism	  to	  this	  approach	  to	  statutory	  interpretation	  is	  the	  fact	  
that	  words	  of	   the	  text	  are	  equated	  with	  the	   intention	  of	   the	   legislature.	  Such	  an	  
approach	  would	  not	  be	   able	   to	   take	   cognisance	  of	   the	   subtleties	   contained	   in	   a	  
section	  such	  as	  197	  of	  the	  Labour	  Relations	  Act.	  	  
	  
The	  text	  in	  context	  or,	  purposive	  approach,	  stands	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  the	  literal	  
approach	   to	   statutory	   interpretation.	   In	   terms	   of	   this	   approach	   the	   interpreter	  
will	  attempt	  to	  go	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  legislator	  by	  taking	  account	  of	  
the	   context	   of	   the	   legislation,	   certain	   political	   or	   policy	   directions	   and	   various	  
social	  directions	  that	  surround	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  legislation.	  As	  opposed	  to	  the	  
literal	  approach,	  an	  interpreter	  will	  take	  account	  of	  the	  context	  of	  the	  legislation	  
from	   the	   outset	   and	   not	   only	   in	   circumstances	   where	   the	   intention	   of	   the	  
legislature	   is	   incapable	   of	   being	   deduced	   from	   the	   plain	  meaning	   of	   the	  words	  
contained	  in	  the	  provision.	  
	  
The	  enactment	  of	  the	  Constitution64has	  had	  a	  drastic	  effect	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
courts	   are	   required	   to	   interpreted	   legislation.65	  The	  Constitution	  has	   effectively	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Botha	  C	  Statutory	  Interpretation	  An	  Introduction	  for	  Students	  (2012).	  
63	  This	  is	  known	  as	  the	  ‘golden	  rule’	  of	  statutory	  interpretation.	  
64	  The	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa	  of	  1996.	  
65	  D	  Davis	  ‘How	  Many	  Positivist	  Legal	  Philosophers	  Can	  Be	  Made	  To	  Dance	  On	  
The	  Head	  of	  A	  Pin?	  A	  Reply	  To	  Professor	  Fagan’	  (2012)	  129	  SALJ	  59.	  D	  Davis	  ‘The	  
Importance	  of	  Reading:	  A	  Rebutter	  to	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  Anton	  Fagan’	  (2013)	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done	   away	  with	   the	   literal	   approach	   and	   confirmed	   the	   purposive	   approach	   as	  
supreme.66	  Section	   39(2)	   of	   The	   Constitution	   is	   a	   peremptory	   provision	   that	  
requires	  courts	   to	   interpret	   legislation	   in	   light	  of	   the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  contained	   in	  
Chapter	   2	   of	   The	   Constitution.	   This,	   in	   accordance	  with	   a	   purposive	   approach,	  
obligates	   the	   interpreter	   to	   have	   regard	   to	   factors	   outside	   the	   text	   of	   the	  
provision	  so	  as	  to	  able	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  legislature.	  
	  
The	   Labour	   Relations	   Act	   confirms	   the	   requirement	   that	   courts	   interpret	   its	  
provisions	   in	   line	   with	   its	   underlying	   purpose.	   The	   Act	   states	   that	   it	   must	   be	  
interpreted:	   To	   give	   effect	   to	   its	   primary	   objects;	   in	   compliance	   with	   the	  
Constitution;	  and	   in	  compliance	  with	   the	  public	   international	   law	  obligations	  of	  
the	  Republic.67This	  effectively	  imposes	  the	  obligation	  on	  any	  person	  applying	  the	  
Act	  to	  interpret	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act	  in	  a	  purposive	  manner.68	  	  
	  
Although	   there	   is	   a	   large	  degree	   of	   consensus	  within	   the	   courts	   and	   academics	  
that	   a	   purposive	   approach	   should	   be	   followed	   when	   section	   197	   stands	   to	   be	  
interpreted,	   there	   is	   some	   dissonance	   as	   to	   the	   ambit	   and	   scope	   of	   what	   the	  
legislature	  intended	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  the	  provision.Bosch69	  argues	  for	  instance	  
that	   the	   intention	   of	   the	   legislature	   is	   broad	   and	   that	   the	   section	   should	   be	  
interpreted	   in	   a	   broad	   and	   expansive	   manner	   so	   as	   to	   give	   effect	   thereto.70	  
Wallis71	  however	  feels	  that	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  legislature	  was	  for	  the	  section	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Botha	  C	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  (n62).	  Botha	  finds	  support	  for	  his	  contention	  in	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  Constitution	  is	  required	  to	  be	  interpreted	  in	  accordance	  its	  objects,	  spirit	  
and	  purport.	  
67	  Section	  3	  of	  the	  Labour	  Relations	  Act	  66	  of	  1995.	  
68	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  Labour	  Relations	  Act	  is	  to	  advance	  economic	  development,	  
social	  justie,	  labour	  peace	  and	  the	  democratisation	  of	  the	  workplace	  by	  fulfilling	  
the	  primary	  objects	  of	  the	  Act.	  The	  primary	  objects	  of	  the	  Act	  include:	  To	  give	  
effect	  to	  and	  regulate	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  conferred	  by	  section	  27	  of	  the	  
Constitution;	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  obligations	  incurred	  by	  South	  Africa	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  its	  membership	  to	  the	  ILO;	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  collective	  
bargaining	  and	  the	  formulation	  of	  industrial	  policy	  by	  trade	  unions,	  employers,	  
and	  employers’	  organisations;	  and	  to	  promote	  orderly	  collective	  bargaining,	  
collective	  bargaining	  at	  sectoral	  level,	  employee	  participation	  in	  decision-­‐making	  
and	  the	  effective	  resolution	  of	  labour	  disputes.	  
69	  C	  Bosch	  ‘Of	  Business	  Parts	  and	  Human	  Stock:	  Some	  Reflections	  on	  section	  
197(1)(a)	  of	  the	  Labour	  Relations	  Act’(2004)	  	  Industrial	  Law	  Journal	  641.	  
70	  Biggs	  (2005)	  supra	  (n3).	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be	  narrower	  in	  scope	  and	  to	  apply	  only	  to	  specific	  transactions.72	  As	  will	  be	  seen	  
in	  what	  is	  to	  follow,	  the	  courts	  have	  construed	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  legislature	  to	  



















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  M	  Wallis	  ‘It’s	  Not	  Bye-­‐Bye	  to	  By’:	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4.Labour	  relations	  relevant	  to	  the	  transfer	  of	  undertakings:	  
4.1.	  Introduction:	  
This	  section	  will	  focus	  on	  section	  197	  of	  the	  Labour	  Relations	  Act	  which	  pertains	  
to	  the	  transfer	  of	  a	  business	  as	  a	  going	  concern.	  Not	  only	  will	  regard	  be	  had	  to	  the	  
particular	   provisions	   of	   the	   section,	   but	   also	   to	   the	   policy	   underlying	   the	  
enactment	   of	   the	   section.	   This	   will	   be	   done	   by	   analysing	   the	   position	   of	   the	  
common	   law	   before	   section	   197	   of	   the	   Act,	   and	   also	   by	   gleaning	   from	   the	  
provisions	   the	   intention	   of	   the	   legislature.	   As	   stated,	   it	   is	   important	   that	   the	  
underlying	   purpose	   of	   the	   section	   be	   borne	   in	   mind	   when	   interpreting	   the	  
requirements	  contained	  in	  section	  197.	  	  
4.2.	  The	  common	  law	  position:	  
The	   contract	   of	   employment	   is	   a	   sui	   generis	   contract	   and	   of	   a	   very	   personal	  
nature.73Under	   such	   contracts,	   it	   is	   contended	   that	   it	   makes	   a	   substantial	  
difference	   to	   the	   employee	   to	  whom	   its	   functions	   are	   to	  be	   rendered,	   and	   such	  
contracts	   can	   therefor	   not	   be	   transferred	  without	   the	   consent	   of	   the	   employee	  
concerned.	  	  
Because	   of	   the	   peculiar	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	   that	   emanates	   from	   such	  
contracts,	   the	   common	   law	   did	   not	   make	   provision	   for	   the	   automatic	   transfer	  
thereof.74	  
	  
Although	   unusual,	   I	   will	   use	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   former	   Industrial	   Court	   in	   the	  
Ntuli	  &	  others	  v	  Hazelmore	  Group	  t/a	  Musgrave	  Nursing	  Home	  case	  to	  set	  out	  the	  
common	  law	  position.75	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  neither	  the	  Labour	  Relations	  
Act	  28	  of	  1956	  nor	  the	  common	  law	  provided	  for	  circumstances	  where	  a	  business	  
or	  part	  thereof	  was	  transferred	  as	  a	  going	  concern.	  The	  facts	  of	  the	  Ntuli	  decision	  
were	   as	   follows:	   The	   four	   applicants	  were	   employed	   by	   the	  Musgrave	   Nursing	  
Home.	   	  The	  nursing	  home	  was	   then	  sold	   to	   the	  respondent,	  Hazelmore	  Nursing	  
Homes.	   The	   applicants	   averred	   that	   their	   services	   were	   not	   terminated	   by	  
Musgrave	  Nursing	  Homes	  prior	  or	  pursuant	  to	  the	  transfer.	  Within	  a	  week	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  W	  Blackie	  F	  Horwitz	  ‘Transfer	  of	  Contracts	  of	  Employment	  as	  a	  Result	  of	  
Mergers	  and	  Acquisitions:	  Astudy	  of	  section	  197	  of	  The	  Labour	  Relations	  Act	  66	  
of	  1995	  (1999)	  ILJ	  1387.	  
74	  N	  Smit	  ‘Should	  Transfer	  of	  undertakings	  be	  statutorily	  regulated	  in	  South	  
Africa’	  (2003)	  Stellenbosch	  Law	  Review	  205.	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transfer,	  the	  applicants	  were	  notified	  that	  certain	  redundancies	  would	  have	  to	  be	  
made,	  and	  that	  members	  of	  staff	  would	  be	  assessed	  to	  ascertain	  their	  suitability	  
for	  positions	   in	   the	  business.	   In	   less	   than	  a	  month,	   the	  applicants	  were	  notified	  
that	   their	   services	   were	   no	   longer	   needed	   and	   they	   were	   subsequently	  
retrenched.	  The	  applicants	  did	  not	  consider	  their	  dismissal	  to	  have	  been	  fair,	  and	  
approached	  the	  court	  for	  relief	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  
	  
The	  court	  was	  asked	  to	  address	  various	  issues	  in	  this	  case,	  one	  of	  which	  was	  to	  
ascertain	  the	  obligations	  of	  the	  transferor	  and	  transferee	  toward	  the	  employees	  
of	   an	   undertaking	   upon	   the	   transfer	   thereof.	   	   The	   court	  made	   reference	   to	   the	  
South	   African	   common	   law,	   South	   African	   legislation,	   and	   the	   provisions	   of	  
foreign	   jurisdictions	   in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  particular	  question.	  Then	  presiding	  
officer	   Landman	   M	   confirmed	   the	   position	   under	   common	   law	   to	   be	   that	   the	  
transferor	  cannot	  transfer	  its	  obligations	  under	  a	  contract	  of	  service	  without	  the	  
consent	   of	   the	   employee	   concerned.	   As	   stated,	   the	   reason	   for	   this	   lies	   in	   the	  
personal	   nature	   of	   contracts	   of	   service.	   In	   order	   for	   such	   a	   contract	   to	   be	  
transferred,	  a	  cession	  and	  delegation	  would	  have	  to	  take	  place,	  seeing	  as	  such	  a	  
contract	  embodies	  both	  rights	  and	  obligations.	  	  
	  
In	  support	  of	  this	  finding,	  Landman	  M	  placed	  reliance	  on	  the	  decision	  in	  Nokes	  v	  
Doncaster	  Amalgamated	  Collieries76	  where	  it	  was	  said	  that	  a	  citizen	  is	  entitled	  to	  
choose	   the	   employer	   for	   whom	   he	   is	   to	   work,	   meaning	   that	   the	   contract	  
embodying	  his	  obligation	  to	  render	  his	  services	  may	  not	  be	  transferred	  without	  
the	   consent	   of	   the	   particular	   employee.	   He	   affirmed	   the	   common	   law	   position	  
that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  agreement	  between	  the	  transferor	  and	  transferee	  as	  to	  
the	   continuity	   of	   employment,	   the	   contracts	   of	   service	   of	   the	   employees	  would	  
come	  to	  an	  end.	  It	  was	  held	  that	  the	  standard	  practice	  in	  the	  ordinary	  course	  of	  
business	  was	  for	  the	  transferor	  to	  terminate	  the	  contracts	  of	  service	  prior	  to	  the	  
transfer	  of	  the	  business.77	  
	  
The	  court	  obliquely	  looked	  at	  the	  practice	  that	  is	  required	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  the	  
transferor	  before	  terminating	  contracts	  of	  employment	  in	  the	  context	  of	  transfer	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  1940	  AC	  1014.	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of	   undertakings,	   by	   making	   reference	   to	   the	   then	   ground	   breaking	   decision	   in	  
Kebeni	   &	   Others	   v	   Cementile	   Products	   (Ciskei)	   (Pty)	   Ltd	   	   &	   Another.78	  The	   court	  
remarked	   that	   the	   obligations	   of	   the	   transferor	   of	   the	   undertaking,	   prior	   to	  
terminating	  the	  contracts	  of	  employment,	  included	  (a)	  giving	  notice	  to	  the	  trade	  
unions	  representing	  the	  employees	  so	  as	  to	  consult	  with	  them	  in	  order	  to	  discuss	  
measures	   that	   will	   safeguard	   and	   protect	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   employees	  
concerned,	  and	   (b)	   to	  give	  notice	   to	   the	  work-­‐force	  as	  a	  whole	  of	   the	  proposed	  
disposition	  of	  the	  business,79	  and	  (c)	  to	  incorporate	  measures	  into	  the	  agreement	  
ensuring	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  work-­‐force.	  One	  such	  measure	  was	  to	  incorporate	  
a	   clause	   into	   the	   agreement	   providing	   for	   the	   contracts	   of	   employment	   to	   be	  
transferred	  to	  the	  transferee	  of	  the	  business,	  much	  like	  the	  effect	  of	  section	  197	  of	  
the	  current	  Labour	  Relations	  Act.	  The	  court,	  however,	  did	  not	  amend	  the	  common	  
law	   by	   providing	   for	   the	   compulsory	   transfer	   of	   employment	   contracts	   in	  
circumstances	  where	  an	  undertaking	  or	  part	  thereof	  had	  been	  transferred.	  	  
	  
What	   can	   be	   elucidated	   from	   the	   above	   is	   the	   barren	   position	   left	   for	   the	  
employees	   of	   an	   undertaking	  which	   is	   subject	   to	   a	   transfer.80	  The	   common	   law	  
placed	   no	   obligations	   on	   transferors	   and	   transferees	   to	  make	   provision	   for	   the	  
continuity	   of	   the	   employee’s	   employment.81Although	   the	  Kebeni	   decision	  made	  
certain	  remarks	  as	   to	   the	  duties	  of	   the	  transferor,	  very	   little	  was	  said	  about	   the	  
obligations	  of	  the	  transferee.	  
	  
Under	   common	   law,	   the	   transferor	   may	   notify	   the	   employee	   of	   the	   intended	  
transfer	   and	   thereafter	   retrench	   the	   employee,	   or	   transfer	   the	   contract	   of	  
employment	   to	   the	   transferee	   provided	   the	   transferee	   accepts	   to	   employ	   the	  
transferee,	  and	  only	  if	  the	  employee	  accepts	  to	  be	  employed	  by	  the	  transferee.82	  
Because	   the	   management	   models,	   financial	   practices	   and	   business	   methods	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  1987	  (8)	  442	  (LC).	  
79 	  In	   this	   regard	   see	   Hoogenoeg	   Andolusite	   (Pty)	   Ltd	   v	   National	   Union	   of	  
Mineworkers	  1992	  13	  ILJ	  87	  (LAC),	  where	  it	  was	  held	  that	  employers	  were	  under	  
an	   obligation	   to	   inform	   its	   employees	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   a	   transfer,	   and	   also	   to	  
consider	  the	  interests	  of	  those	  affected	  employees	  when	  negotiating	  the	  contract	  
that	  would	  result	  in	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  undertaking.	  	  
80	  M	  Wallis	  ‘If	  Section	  197	  is	  the	  medium,	  what	  is	  the	  message?’	  (2000)	  Industrial	  
Law	  Journal	  1.	  	  
81	  Smit	  (2003)op	  cit	  (n74).	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business	  owners	  differ,	  different	  preferences	  may	  be	  had	  as	   to	   the	  people	   to	  be	  
employed	  by	  a	  particular	  undertaking.	  This	  will	  invariably	  influence	  the	  decision	  
of	   the	   transferee	   to	  employ	  a	  particular	  person	   that	  had	  been	  employed	  by	   the	  
transferor.	  An	  employee	  that	  is	  highly	  regarded	  by	  the	  transferor	  may	  be	  found	  to	  
be	  inadequately	  equipped	  to	  perform	  a	  function	  by	  the	  transferee.	  Then,	  as	  to	  the	  
undertaking	   itself,	   the	   transferee	   may	   want	   to	   downsize	   the	   particular	  
undertaking,	   close	   it	  down	   to	  harvest	   the	  assets	  or	   restructure	   the	  undertaking	  
before	   reselling	   it,	   resulting	   in	   redundancies	   of	   particular	   employees	   and	  
rendering	  such	  employees	  unemployed.	  	  
	  
Various	   other	   questions	   remained	   such	   as	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   transferee	   has	  
committed	   an	   unfair	   labour	   practice	   by	   retrenching	   particular	   employees	   after	  
the	   transfer,	  or	   the	  question	  of	  whether	   the	   transferor	  or	   transferee	   is	   liable	   to	  
pay	   severance	   pay	   to	   the	   employees	   so	   retrenched.	   Such	   questions,	   although	  
important,	  remain	  outside	  the	  ambit	  of	  this	  dissertation	  and	  will	  therefore	  not	  be	  
discussed	  further.	  	  
4.3.	  Section	  197	  of	  the	  Labour	  Relations	  Act:	  
This	  section	  will	  comprise	  of	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  current	  provisions	  of	  section	  197	  
of	  the	  Labour	  Relations	  Act.	  Regard	  will	  be	  had	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  those	  provisions,	  
also	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   courts	   have	   gone	   about	   in	   applying	   them.	  	  
Importantly,	   the	   intention	   of	   the	   legislature	   and	   policy	   underlying	   section	   197	  
will	  be	  gleaned	   from	  this	  discussion.	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	   the	  underlying	  purpose	  of	  
the	   provisions	   of	   section	   197	   has	   allowed	   the	   courts	   to	   adopt	   a	   purposive	  
approach	   in	   interpreting	   the	   requirements	   contained	   in	   the	   section.	   This	   has	  
resulted	  in	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  range	  of	  transactions	  that	  would	  not	  have	  normally	  
attracted	  its	  application.	  
	  
Section	   197	   is	   to	   be	   found	   in	   chapter	   eight	   of	   the	   Labour	   Relations	   Act	  which	  
deals	   with	   unfair	   dismissals.	   The	   core	   of	   the	   section	   lies	   in	   subsection	   2	   and	  
states	  that:	  	  
	  
“If	  a	  transfer	  of	  a	  business	  takes	  place,	  unless	  otherwise	  agreed	  in	  terms	  of	  subsection	  (6)	  –	  	  
	  
a) The	  new	  employer	   Is	  automatically	  substituted	   in	   the	  place	  of	   the	  old	  employer	   in	  respect	  of	  all	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b) All	  the	  rights	  and	  obligations	  between	  the	  old	  employer	  and	  employee	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  transfer	  
continue	  in	  force	  as	  if	  they	  were	  rights	  and	  obligations	  between	  the	  new	  employer	  and	  employee	  
	  
c) Anything	  done	  before	  the	  transfer	  by	  or	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  old	  employer,	  including	  the	  dismissal	  of	  
an	   employee	   or	   the	   commission	   of	   an	   unfair	   labour	   practice	   or	   act	   of	   unfair	   discrimination,	   is	  
considered	  to	  have	  been	  done	  by	  or	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  new	  employer;	  and	  
	  
d) The	   transfer	   does	   not	   interrupt	   the	   employee’s	   continuity	   of	   employment,	   and	   an	   employee’s	  
contract	  of	  employment	  continues	  with	  the	  new	  employer	  as	  if	  with	  the	  old	  employer.”	  
	  
It	   has	   been	   stated	   that	   section	   197	   purports	   to	   balance	   various	   competing	  
interests	   that	  may	  be	  affected	  when	  an	  undertaking	   is	   transferred,	  such	  as;	   the	  
employee’s	   continuity	   of	   employment,	   its	   right	   to	   choose	   its	   employer,	   the	  
reluctance	   of	   the	   transferee	   to	   comply	   with	   obligations	   that	   were	   created	  
between	  the	  transferor	  and	  the	  employee,	  the	  transferor’s	  interest	  in	  securing	  a	  
smooth	  and	  successful	  transfer	  of	  his	  undertaking,	  and	  the	  transferee’s	   interest	  
in	  choosing	  the	  people	  to	  form	  part	  of	  his	  workforce.83	  
	  
The	   freedom	   of	   the	   employee	   to	   choose	   her	   employer	   is	   overridden	   by	   this	  
section,	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   transferee	   is	   automatically	   substituted	   for	   the	  
transferor. 84 The	   contracts	   of	   employment	   remain	   in	   force	   between	   the	  
transferee	   and	   the	   employee	   and	   the	   employee	   can	   therefore	   enforce	   any	  
provision	  of	   such	   a	   contract	   against	   the	   transferee.	  This	   results	   in	   a	  departure	  
from	  the	  common	  law	  position	  where	  the	  employee’s	  consent	  to	  be	  employed	  by	  
a	   particular	   person	  was	   central	   to	   the	   continuity	   of	   its	   employment.	   It	   can	   be	  
stated	   that	   the	   employee’s	   freedom	   to	   choose	   his	   or	   her	   employer	   has	   been	  
subjugated	  to	  the	  policy	  of	  ensuring	  the	  greater	  good	  for	  the	  entire	  work-­‐force;	  
the	   provision	   purports	   to	   ensure	   the	   continuity	   of	   the	   employment	   of	   the	  
employees	  of	   the	   entire	  business,	   or	   part	   of	   the	  business	   that	   is	   subject	   to	   the	  
transfer.	  	  
	  
Apart	   from	   the	   criticisms	   attracted	   by	   the	   enactment	   of	   section	   197,	   various	  
advantages	  are	  attracted	  by	  its	  application.	  Firstly,	  the	  security	  of	  employment	  of	  
the	  work	  force	  is	  ensured.	  Secondly,	   large	  transaction	  costs	  associated	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  A	  Van	  Niekerk	  et	  al	  Law	  @	  Work	  (2012).	  Smit	  (2003)	  op	  cit	  (n74).	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transfer	   of	   an	   undertaking	   and	   primarily	   borne	   by	   the	   transferor	   will	   be	  
eliminated	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   transferor	   will	   be	   relieved	   from	   paying	  
severance	   pay	   to	   retrenched	   employees.	   Thirdly,	   the	   transferee	   gains	   large	  
commercial	  advantages	  by	  retaining	  experienced	  and	  trained	  employees.85	  
4.3.1.	  Requirements	  of	  section	  197:	  
It	   is	   important	  to	  determine	  when	  section	  197	  will	  apply,	  especially	  because	  of	  
the	  peculiar	   effects	   that	  will	   ensue	  as	   a	   result	   thereof.	  A	   careful	   reading	  of	   the	  
section	  reveals	  three	  requirements	  that	  have	  to	  be	  met	  in	  order	  for	  the	  section	  to	  
be	  applicable.	  	  
	  
	  
The	   three	   requirements	   are:	   firstly,	   a	   transfer	   by	   one	   employer	   to	   another;	  
secondly,	   the	   transferred	  entity	  must	  be	   the	  whole	  or	  part	  of	  a	  business,	   trade,	  
undertaking	  or	  a	  service;	  and	  thirdly,	  the	  business	  must	  be	  transferred	  as	  a	  going	  
concern.86Each	  of	  these	  requirements	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  due	  course.	  Because	  of	  
the	  complex	  nature	  of	  section	  197	  and	  the	  problems	  that	  arise	  with	  regards	  to	  its	  
application	   to	   franchising	   agreements,	   reference	   will	   be	   made	   to	   foreign	  
legislation	  and	  how	  the	  courts	  of	  those	  jurisdictions	  have	  gone	  about	  in	  applying	  
its	  relevant	  provisions.87	  
4.3.1.1.	  The	  meaning	  of	  Transfer:	  
	  Section	  197	  (1)	  (b)	  defines	  transfer	   to	  mean	   ‘the	  transfer	  of	  a	  business	  by	  one	  
employer	  (the	  old	  employer)	  to	  another	  employer	  (the	  new	  employer)	  as	  a	  going	  
concern’.	  The	  section	  does	  not	  continue	  to	  specify	  instances	  in	  which	  a	  transfer	  
will	   be	   deemed	   to	   occur	   and	   it	   is	   for	   this	   reason	   that	   case	   law	   must	   be	  
approached	  to	  provide	  assistance.88	  
	  
From	  the	  face	  of	   it,	   it	  appears	  that	  at	   least	   two	  people	  must	  be	   involved	   in	  this	  
transfer;	   the	   old	   and	   new	   employers	   respectively.	   Secondly	   the	   undertaking	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  (n83).	  
86	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  (n83).	  
87	  Biggs	  (2005)	  op	  cit	  (n3).	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must	   be	   transferred	   between	   these	   parties	   as	   a	   going	   concern.89	  It	   has	   been	  
suggested	   that	   ‘transfer’	   refers	   to	   the	   method	   in	   which	   the	   business	   or	  
undertaking	   is	   changed	   hands.	   Instances	   that	   spring	   to	   mind	   are	   transfers	  
pursuant	   to	   the	   sale	   of	   a	   business	   or	   undertaking,	   mergers,	   acquisitions	   and	  
other	  restructuring	  activities.	  	  
	  
This	   is	   by	   no	  means	   a	   closed	   list	   especially	  when	   considering	   the	   positions	   of	  
commentators	  and	  judicial	  decisions	  that	  call	  for	  a	  robust	  and	  wide	  definition	  of	  
this	  concept.90	  
What	   is	  not	   included	  in	  the	   list	  of	   instances	  are	  those	  circumstances	  where	  the	  
ownership	  of	  a	  company	  is	  sold	  by	  way	  of	  a	  share	  transfer.91	  The	  reason	  for	  its	  
exclusion	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   company	   is	  distinct	   in	   law	   from	   its	  members	   and	  
that	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  employer	  will	  be	  the	  same	  as	  before	  the	  transfer.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  Schutte	  v	  Powerplus	  Performance	  (Pty)	  Ltd92it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  
‘transfer’	   goes	   beyond	   mere	   instances	   of	   sale	   and	   includes	   restructuring	  
operations,	   mergers	   and	   take-­‐overs.	   	   It	   was	   further	   held	   that	   such	   operations	  
might	   take	   place	   by	   way	   of	   a	   donation	   or	   an	   exchange	   of	   assets	   and	   still	  
constitute	  a	  transfer.	  The	  decision	  in	  the	  Schutte	  case	  can	  be	  categorised	  to	  form	  
part	   of	   the	   larger	   choir	   singing	   the	   praises	   of	   a	   purposive	   interpretation	   of	  
section	  197.	  The	  decisions	  in	  Tekwini	  Security	  Services	  CC	  v	  Mavana,93	  and	  Pexies	  
Restaurant	  v	  Chelane	  Ephraim	  Moshela94	  further	  attest	  to	  this	  proposition.	  In	  the	  
Tekwini	  decision	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  contract	  between	  the	  transferor	  and	  transferee	  
did	   not	   deter	   the	   court	   from	   finding	   that	   a	   transfer	   had	   occurred.	   In	  Pexies,	   a	  
transfer	  was	  held	   to	  have	  occurred	  where	   the	   seller	   regained	  possession	  of	   an	  
undertaking	   previously	   sold.	   In	   both	   of	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   decisions	   it	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  N	  Smit,	  G	  Mpedi	  ‘An	  Update	  on	  Labour	  Law	  Developments	  from	  the	  South	  
African	  Courts:	  May	  2010-­‐February	  2012:	  Aantekeninge	  (2012)	  3	  Tydskrif	  vir	  die	  
Suid-­‐Afrikaanse	  Reg	  522.	  
90	  N	  Smit	  ‘The	  Labour	  Relations	  Act	  and	  Transfer	  of	  Undertakings:	  The	  Notion	  of	  
a	   Transfer	   (2003)	  De	   Jure	   328.	   Also	   see	  Schutte	  v	  Powerplus	  Performance	   (Pty)	  
Ltd	  (1999)	  20	  ILJ	  655	  (LC).	  
91	  Ndimas	  v	  Waverly	  Blankets	  Ltd	  (1999)	  20	  ILJ	  1563	  (LC).	  Long	  v	  Prism	  Holdings	  
(2010)	  ILJ	  2110	  (LC).	  
92	  Supra	  (n90).	  
93	  1999	  20	  ILJ	  2721	  (LC).	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confirmed	   that	   regard	  must	  be	  had	   to	   the	  TUPE95	  regulations	  seeing	  as	   section	  
197	  derives	  therefrom.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  reflect	  on	  
the	  decisions	  relating	  thereto,	  albeit	  briefly.	  It	  will	  further	  be	  necessary	  to	  have	  
regard	   to	   those	  decisions	   in	  which	   the	  European	  Community’s	  Acquired	  Rights	  
Directive96	  have	   been	   interpreted,	   seeing	   as	   it	   and	   the	   provisions	   of	   TUPE	   are	  
inextricably	  linked	  with	  each	  other.	  	  
	  
Section	   197,	   the	   directive,	   and	   TUPE	   accept	   that	   employees	   stand	   to	   suffer	  
prejudice	   in	   those	   instances	   where	   contracts	   of	   employment	   are	   to	   be	  
transferred.97If	  this	  is	  the	  raison	  d’etre	  of	  those	  provisions,	  namely	  protection	  of	  
the	  work	  force,	  it	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  an	  interpretation	  must	  be	  called	  for	  that	  
purports	  to	  protect	  the	  employee	  in	  transfer	  transactions.	  It	  is	  easily	  discernable	  
from	   the	   following	   judgements	   that	   the	   wide	   and	   robust	   approach	   to	   the	  
interpretation	  of	  section	  197	  is	  ascribable	  thereto.	  The	  judgments	  handed	  down	  
by	   the	   European	   courts	   and	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	   South	   African	   Labour	   and	  
Labour	   Appeal	   courts	   confirm	   this	   contention.	   There	   are	   commentators	   that	  
argue,	   in	   addition	   to	   employee	   protection,	   that	   courts	   follow	   the	   broad	   and	  
robust	  approach	  to	  prevent	  parties	  from	  structuring	  their	  transactions	  in	  such	  a	  
way	   so	  as	   to	   circumvent	   the	  application	  of	   the	   relevant	   labour	  provisions;	   this	  
also	  goes	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  these	  provisions	  which	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  work	  force.98	  
	  
Under	  the	  Acquired	  Rights	  Directive	  European	  courts	  have	  held	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  
transactions	   to	   attract	   the	   application	   of	   the	   Directive.	   In	   the	   Sophie	  Redmond	  
Stichtung	   v	   Hendrikus	   Bartol	   decision99a	   transfer	   was	   held	   to	   have	   occurred	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Transfer	   of	   Undertaking	   (Protection	   of	   Employment)	   Regulations	   1981,	   SI	  
1981/1794,	   as	   amended	   by	   TUPE	   Regulations	   of	   2006.	   The	   TUPE	   regulations	  
were	   created	   under	   British	   law	   to	   provide	   protection	   to	   affected	   employees	  
within	   the	   transfer	   of	   undertakings.	   Similarly	   to	   the	   TUPE	   regulations,	   the	  
Acquired	   Rights	   Directive	   serves	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   terms	   and	   conditions	   of	  
employment	  are	  maintained	  for	  employees	  that	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  transfer	  
of	   an	   undertaking.	  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definiti
ons/acquiredrightsdirective.htm.	  (Accessed	  on	  4	  October	  2013).	  
96	  Directive	  77/187,	  as	  amended	  by	  Directive	  98/50/EC	  and	  as	  Consolidated	  by	  
Directive	  2001/23/EC.	  
97	  Smit	  (2003)	  op	  cit	  (90).	  
98	  Blackie	  (1999)	  op	  cit	  (n73).	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where	  a	  legal	  person	  ceased	  activities	  due	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  government	  subsidies	  to	  
a	  competitive	  organisation	  with	  similar	  aims.	  In	  the	  decision	  between	  Foreningen	  
af	  Arbejdsledere	  I	  Danmark	  v	  Daddy’s	  Dance	  Hall	  A/C100the	  cancellation	  of	  a	  lease	  
agreement	  of	  a	  restaurant	  followed	  by	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  management	  contract	  
to	   another	   operator	   was	   held	   to	   constitute	   a	   transfer.	   Similarly	   in	   Berg	   v	  
Besselen,101	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  held	  that	  the	  directive	  was	  applicable	  
where	  a	  discotheque	  was	   transferred	  pursuant	   to	  a	   lease/purchase	  agreement,	  
and	   that	   the	   directive	   was	   also	   applicable	   where	   the	   undertaking	   had	   to	   be	  
transferred	  back	   to	   the	   lessor/seller	   as	   a	   result	  of	   an	  order	  made	  by	   the	   court	  
terminating	  the	  contract	  between	  the	  parties.	  
	  
An	   important	   question	   then	   stands	   to	   be	   answered.	   That	   is	   whether	   the	  
approach	   followed	   by	   the	   European	   courts	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   meaning	   of	   a	  
‘transfer’	   is	   wide	   enough	   to	   encompass	   transactions	   like	   outsourcing,	   second-­‐
generation	  outsourcing,	  compulsory	   tendering,	  and	   termination	  and	   transfer	  of	  
franchise	  agreements.	  	  
	  
The	   South	   African	   courts	   have	   held	   the	   provisions	   of	   section	   197	   to	   apply	   to	  
outsourcing	  transactions.102The	  notable	  decision	  of	  NEHAWU	  v	  University	  of	  Cape	  
Town103	  stated	   that	   transactions	   where	   cleaning,	   gardening	   and	   maintenance	  
services	   are	   outsourced	   they	   potentially	   fall	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	   section	  
197.104The	  decision	   in	   the	   South	  African	  Municipal	  Workers	  Union	  and	  Others	  v	  
Rand	   Airport	   Management	   Company	   (Pty)	   Ltd	   and	   Others 105 	  confirms	   this	  
position.106	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  Case	  324/86	  1988	  ECR	  739.	  
101	  1988	  ECR	  2559	  (ECJ).	  
102	  An	  outsourcing	  transaction	  takes	  place	  where	  services	  are	  put	  out	  to	  tender	  
for	  a	  fee.	  The	  contractor	  to	  whom	  the	  services	  are	  tendered	  will	  then	  perform	  the	  
services	  in	  return	  for	  a	  fee	  for	  a	  determined	  period	  of	  time.	  
103	  (2003)	  24	  ILJ	  95	  (CC).	  
104	  The	  court,	  however,	  declined	   to	  make	  an	  order	   specifically	  applying	  section	  
197	   to	   the	   particular	   set	   of	   facts,	   and	   referred	   the	  matter	   back	   to	   the	   Labour	  
Appeal	  Court.	  	  	  
105	  (2005)	  3	  BLLR	  241	  (LAC).	  
106	  If	   the	   transaction,	   outsourcing	   particular	   services,	   comply	   with	   all	   of	   the	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Notably	  both	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  judgments	  make	  reference	  to	  the	  decisions	  
of	   the	   European	   courts.	   The	   importance	   of	   European	   case	   law	   is	   particularly	  
relevant	  when	  it	  is	  asked	  whether	  section	  197	  is	  applicable	  to	  second-­‐generation	  
outsourcing	   transactions.	   The	  decision	   in	  Dines	  v	   Initial	  Services107prescribed	   a	  
two-­‐phased	   approach	   to	   determine	   if	   a	   second-­‐generation	   outsourcing	  
transaction	  fell	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  the	  transfer	  provisions.	   It	  was	  held	  that	  the	  
absence	  of	  a	  contractual	  relationship	  between	  the	  old	  and	  new	  employer	  is	  not	  a	  
determinative	   criteria	   for	   ascertaining	   whether	   a	   transfer	   has	   taken	   place.	   	   A	  
transfer	   will	   therefore	   be	   deemed	   to	   have	   taken	   place	   where	   a	   service	   is	  
outsourced	   by	   an	   undertaking,	   the	   contract	   providing	   for	   such	   outsourcing	  
cancelled,	   and	   thereafter	   issued	   and	   transferred	   to	   another	   service	   provider.	  	  
This	  approach	  entails	  that	  upon	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  contract	  to	  outsource	  it	  is	  
reverted	   back	   to	   the	   original	   employer/transferor	   and	   is	   therefore	   capable	   of	  
being	   transferred	   when	   it	   is	   reissued	   to	   a	   different	   service	   provider.	   This	  
decision	  was	   followed	  by	   the	  Labour	  Court	   in	  COSAWU	  v	  Zikhethele	  Trade	  (Pty)	  
Ltd.108It	   was	   held	   that	   section	   197	   does	   not	   upon	   the	   plain	   reading	   of	   the	  
provisions	   provide	   for	   the	   application	   to	   outsourcing	   and	   second-­‐generation	  
outsourcing	  contracts.	  However,	  the	  court	  followed	  a	  purposive	  interpretation	  of	  
the	  provisions	   to	   include	   the	   transfer	   of	   contracts	   of	   service	  provided	   that	   the	  
business	  remained	  the	  same	  after	  the	  transaction.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   submitted	   that	   second-­‐generation	   outsourcing	   should	   be	   included	   in	   the	  
application	   field	   of	   section	   197.	   It	   has	   been	   clearly	   established	   that	   first-­‐
generation	   outsourcing	   falls	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	   section	   197,	   and	   rightly	   so,	  
seeing	   as	   it	   complies	   with	   the	   requirements	   of	   section	   197.	   If	   second	   and	  
subsequent	   outsourcing	   contracts	   were	   to	   be	   excluded	   from	   section	   197	  
commercial	  disparities	  and	  difficulties	  may	  arise.	  	  
	  
Proprietors	  would	  want	  to	  enter	  into	  transactions	  at	  a	  stage	  later	  than	  the	  first	  
generation	   of	   transfer	   and	   outsourcing	   contracts,	   seeing	   as	   this	   would	   entitle	  
them	   to	   evade	   the	   costs	   and	   difficulties	   involved	   in	   a	   situation	   where	   all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  (1994)	  IRLR	  336	  (EAT).	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contracts	  of	  employment	  are	   transferred	   to	   the	   transferee.109This	  will	   result	   in	  
the	   employees	   involved	   in	   second-­‐generation	   transactions	   to	   be	   less	  protected	  
than	   those	   under	   the	   first	   transaction.	   Clearly	   this	   is	   unacceptable	   and	   goes	  
against	   the	  rights	  of	  equality,	   fair	   labour	  practices,	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  that	  
the	  South	  African	  Constitution	  provides	  for	  in	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights.110	  
	  
It	  is	  therefore	  submitted	  that	  a	  purposive	  interpretation	  of	  section	  197	  is	  capable	  
of	  including	  second-­‐generation	  outsourcing	  transactions	  within	  its	  purview.	  The	  
only	  way	  in	  which	  such	  transactions	  are	  to	  be	  excluded	  is	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  
other	  substantive	  requirements	  of	  section	  197.	  
	  
The	   Constitutional	   Court	   confirmed	   this	   in	   the	   case	   between	  Aviation	  Union	  of	  
South	  Africa	  v	  SA	  Airways	  (Pty)	  Ltd.111	  In	  delivering	  the	  judgement	  the	  majority	  of	  
the	   Constitutional	   Court	   held	   that	   a	   transfer	   from	  one	   employer	   to	   another	   as	  
opposed	  to	  by	  one	  employer	  to	  another	  was	  capable	  of	  constituting	  a	  transfer	  for	  
the	   purposes	   of	   section	   197.	   This	   essentially	   brought	   second-­‐generation	  
outsourcing	  transactions	  that	  complied	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  section	  197	  to	  
within	  its	  purview.	  
4.3.1.2.	  The	  meaning	  of	  a	  business:	  
Section	   197	   defines	   a	   business	   to	   mean	   the	   whole	   or	   any	   part	   of	   a	   business,	  
trade,	   undertaking	   or	   service.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   place	   the	   enterprise	   that	   is	  
subject	   to	   the	   transfer	   under	   the	   proverbial	   microscope	   to	   ascertain	   if	   it	   falls	  
under	   the	   provisions	   of	   section	   197,	   because	   only	   those	   entities	   transferred	  
within	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  section	  will	  enjoy	  its	  application.	  	  
	  
Firstly	  the	  meaning	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  business,	  trade,	  service	  or	  undertaking	  
will	  be	   considered,	   thereafter,	   attention	  will	  be	  paid	   to	   the	  question	  of	  what	   is	  
meant	  by	  a	  part	  of	  a	  business,	  trade,	  undertaking	  or	  service.	  An	  important	  part	  of	  
this	   section	   will	   be	   dedicated	   to	   the	   difficult	   task	   of	   determining	   whether	   a	  
business	  has	  been	  transferred	  in	  outsourcing	  transactions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  (n83).	  
110	  The	  Constitution	  of	  The	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa	  of	  1996,	  hereinafter	  referred	  
to	  as	  the	  1996	  Constitution.	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It	   is	   under	   the	   section	   devoted	   to	   the	   study	   of	   what	   constitutes	   a	   part	   of	   a	  
business	  where	  outsourcing	  transactions	  will	  be	  discussed.	  	  
	  
Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  South	  African	  jurisprudence	  in	  this	  regard,	  guidance	  must	  be	  
sought	  in	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  European	  courts.	  Reference	  will	  therefore	  be	  made	  
to	   relevant	   European	   decisions.	   In	   determining	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   transferred	  
entity,	   guidelines	   exist	   as	   to	   factors	   that	   need	   to	   be	   considered.	   Such	   factors	  
include:	   assets;	   goodwill	   of	   the	   undertaking;	   the	   employees	   involved;	  
management	   staff;	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   work	   is	   organised;	   operational	  
resources	  available	  to	  it,	  etc.112	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  
of	   a	   transfer,	   it	   must	   be	   asked	   what	   the	   transferor	   will	   be	   divested	   of	   and	  
whether	   that	   can	   be	   typified	   as	   a	   business,	   trade	   or	   undertaking. 113 One	  
judgement	   of	   the	   Labour	   Court	   appears	   to	   shed	   some	   light	   on	   the	   evasive	  
concept	   of	   a	   ‘business’.	   In	   National	   Union	   of	   Metalworkers	   of	   SA	   v	   Staman	  
Automatic	  CC114the	   court	   reflected	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   employees	  
and	  assets	  used	  by	  them	  in	  order	  to	  manufacture	  certain	  products	  for	  the	  benefit	  
of	  the	  business.	  The	  respondent	  was	  a	  manufacturer	  of	  components	  for	  various	  
industries	   such	   as	   that	   of:	   furniture;	   automotive;	   electronic;	   construction,	   etc.	  
Machines	   were	   used	   and	   operated	   by	   the	   employees	   to	   bring	   forth	   the	  
manufactured	  components.	  The	  respondent	  tried	  to	  transfer	  the	  employees	  to	  a	  
temporary	   employment	   service.	   In	   asking	   the	   question	   of	   what	   the	   transferor	  
was	  divested	  of,	   it	  was	  clear	  that	   it	  was	  only	  the	  employees	  affected.	  What	  was	  
not	   transferred	   was	   a	   business.	   No	  manufacturing	   equipment	   or	   assets,	   apart	  
from	  the	  employees	  were	  transferred,	  with	  the	  consequence	  that	  no	  components	  
could	   be	  manufactured	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   employees	  did	  not	   possess	   the	  
necessary	  equipment	  to	  produce	  it.	  	  
	  
The	  court	  held	  that	  the	  transferor	  tried	  to	  transfer	  the	  services	  of	  the	  employees.	  
It	  must	  not	  be	  understood	  that	  services	  are	  incapable	  of	  constituting	  a	  business.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  Van	  Niekerk(2012)	  op	  cit	  (n83).	  
113	  Bosch	  (2004)	  supra	  (n69).	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Section	  197	  clearly	  provides	  for	  this	  and	  has	  been	  interpreted	  to	  mean	  as	  much	  
by	   the	   Labour	   Appeal	   Court	   in	   the	   Rand	   Air	   decision.	   What	   is	   important	   to	  
deduce	  from	  the	  Staman	  Automatic	  case	  is	  that	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  have	  regard	  to	  
the	   particular	   undertaking	   as	   such.	   The	   particular	   business,	   service	   or	  
undertaking	  provided	  must	  be	  ascertained,	  upon	  which	   it	  musk	  be	  asked	  what	  
assets	  are	  necessary	  to	  further	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  particular	  entity.	  	  	  
	  
If	   the	   undertaking	   requires	   assets	   of	   a	   particular	   nature	   to	   serve	   its	   purpose,	  
there	   can	   clearly	   be	   no	   transfer	   if	   the	   employees	   are	   transferred	   without	   the	  
necessary	  assets.	  Inversely,	  where	  an	  undertaking	  solely	  provides	  services	  and	  is	  
then	  transferred	  without	  any	  assets,	  a	  transfer	  may	  occur	  if	  the	  employees	  that	  
provide	   the	   services	   are	   transferred	   without	   any	   assets,	   provided	   that	   they	  
consist	   over	   the	   capacity	   to	  perform	   the	   same	   functions	   and	  provide	   the	   same	  
services	  after	  the	  transfer.	  Importantly,	  however,	  the	  services	  so	  provided	  must	  
be	  ascertained	  by	  taking	  the	  whole	  package	  into	  account.	  It	  has	  been	  held	  by	  the	  
European	   Court	   of	   Justice	   that	   the	   entity	   cannot	   be	   typified	   by	  merely	   having	  
regard	  to	  the	  activity	  entrusted	  to	  it.115	  
	  
Under	   the	   European	   Directives	   on	   the	   transfer	   of	   undertakings,	   the	   European	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  developed	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  ‘economic	  entity’	  to	  determine	  if	  
a	   business	   has	   been	   transferred.	   The	   judgment	   of	   Süzen	   v	   Zehnacker	  
Gebaudereiniging	   GmbH	  Krankenhausservice116defined	   it	   to	   mean	   an	   organised	  
grouping	   of	   people	   and	   assets,	   that	   work	   together	   to	   further	   a	   particular	  
economic	  activity	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  undertaking	  involved.	  
This	   position	   is	   clearly	   in	   accord	   with	   the	   approach	   followed	   by	   the	   Staman	  
Automatic	  case,	  where	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  function	  of	  the	  undertaking,	  
the	   assets,	   and	   employees	   involved	   were	   emphasised	   in	   ascertaining	   whether	  
the	  subject	  of	  the	  transfer	  was	  a	  business.	  
	  
As	  stated,	  problems	  arise	  in	  situations	  where	  parts	  of	  businesses	  or	  undertakings	  
are	  transferred.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115C	  Bosch	  ‘Transfers	  of	  Contracts	  of	  Employment	  in	  the	  Outsourcing	  Context’	  
(2001)	  ILJ	  840.	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In	   such	   circumstances	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   ascertained	   if	   it	   formed	   part	   of	   the	  
transferors’	  business.	  The	  catalyst	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  a	  part	  of	  a	  business,	  in	  most	  
instances,	   takes	   the	   form	   of	   outsourcing	   transactions.	   Outsourcing	   pertains	   to	  
the	  hiring	  of	  service	  providers	  outside	  the	  enterprise	  to	  take	  over	  a	  function	  or	  
department	   of	   the	   transferor’s	   enterprise.	   Non-­‐core	   activities	   are	   usually	  
involved	  in	  these	  transactions.117	  Because	  the	  outsourced	  service	  must	  form	  part	  
of	   the	  business,	  difficult	  questions	  are	  brought	   into	  the	  frame:	  such	  as	  whether	  
the	   transferred	  entity	   formed	  part	  of	   the	  core	  business	  of	   the	  enterprise;	   if	   the	  
transferred	   entity	   constituted	   a	   service;	   which	   assets,	   if	   any	   were	   needed	   to	  
provide	  the	  service,	  etc.	  	  
	  
From	  the	  outset,	  a	  distinction	  has	  to	  be	  made	  between	  the	  form	  and	  substance	  of	  
the	  entity	  transferred.	  The	  Rand	  Airport	  decision	  illustrates	  this	  point	  succinctly.	  
The	   Labour	   Appeal	   Court	   held	   that	   the	   outsourcing	   of	   gardening	   and	   security	  
services	   constituted	  a	  part	  of	   a	  business	   for	  purposes	  of	   section	  197.The	  court	  
reached	  this	  finding	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  provisions	  of	  section	  197	  which	  states	  that	  
business	  or	  part	  thereof	  includes	  the	  provision	  of	  a	  service.	  The	  court	  therefore	  
placed	  reliance	  only	  on	  the	  inclusion	  of,	  a	  ‘service’,	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  business	  
in	  section	  197.	  The	  investigation	  as	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  objective	  and	  
purpose	  of	  the	  business,	  and	  how	  the	  employees	  contributed	  to	  the	  furtherance	  
thereof	  had	  thus	  been	  disregarded.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   court	   a	   quo,	   account	   was	   taken	   of	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   factors	   such	   as	   the	  
goodwill,	   management	   structure,	   objective	   of	   making	   a	   profit,	   and	   whether	   it	  
formed	  part	  of	  the	  core	  functions	  of	  the	  business.	  Upon	  taking	  those	  factors	  into	  
account,	  it	  was	  found	  that	  a	  business	  was	  not	  transferred	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
services	  did	  not	  constitute	  a	  part	  of	  the	  transferors’	  business.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  
accordance	  with	   the	   approach	   followed	   in	   the	   Staman	  Automatic	   case	   and	   the	  
position	   of	   the	   European	   courts.	   Although	   the	   inclusion	   of	   services	   in	   the	  
definition	   of	   a	   ‘business’	   in	   section	   197	   is	   an	   important	   indication	   as	   to	   the	  
nature	  of	  the	  enterprise,	  this	  has	  to	  be	  considered	  together	  with	  the	  other	  factors	  
mentioned.	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This	   position	   has	   been	   supported	   by	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   in	   the	  NEHAWU	  
decision	   where	   it	   was	   held	   that	   regard	   must	   be	   had	   to	   the	   substance	   of	   the	  
transaction	  and	  that	  in	  order	  to	  ascertain	  what	  the	  substance	  is	  it	  must	  be	  asked	  
if	  assets	  were	  transferred	  with	  the	  employees,	  among	  other	  things.	  If	  the	  enquiry	  
is	   not	   done	   in	   such	   a	  manner,	   a	   very	   limited	   number	   of	   transactions	   will	   not	  
attract	  the	  application	  of	  section	  197.	  
	  
In	  order	   for	   the	  part	  of	  a	  business	   to	  be	  covered	  by	  section	  197,	   it	  must	  be	  an	  
identifiable	   component	   of	   a	   business	   that	   is	   severable	   from	   the	   entire	  
business.118This	   will	   only	   be	   done	   if	   regard	   is	   had	   to	   the	   substance	   of	   the	  
transaction,	  and	  the	  substance	  will	  only	  be	  ascertained	  if	  the	  particular	  functions	  
provided,	   assets	   involved,	  management	   structure	   and	   purpose	   of	   “part”	   of	   the	  
business	  is	  considered	  cumulatively.	  	  The	  Canadian	  courts	  support	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  
identifiable	   and	   distinguishable	   part	   of	   a	   business.	   In	   Transport	   Ducharme	  
Inc119it	  was	  held	  that	   in	  order	   for	  an	  entity	  to	  qualify	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  business,	   it	  
must	  be	   identifiable	  as	  a	   functioning	  entity	  that	   is	  viable	   in	   itself	  or	  sufficiently	  
distinguishable	  to	  be	  severable	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  
	  
The	   European	   Court	   of	   Justice	   has	   stated	   that	   a	   group	   of	   wage	   earners	   are	  
capable	   of	   constituting	   an	   economic	   entity.120	  An	   economic	   entity,	   it	   was	   held,	  
refers	   to	   an	   organised	   grouping	   of	   persons	   and	   assets	   and	   which	   pursues	   a	  
specific	   objective.	   It	  must	   also	   be	   autonomous	   and	   sufficiently	   structured,	   and	  
need	  not	  necessarily	  consist	  over	  significant	  assets,	   if	  any.	  If	  such	  a	  grouping	  of	  
persons	  and	  assets	  are	  sufficiently	  organised,	   it	  will	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  clearly	  
identified	   and	   severed	   from	   the	   business.	   It	  will	   therefore	   be	   capable	   of	   being	  
classified	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  business,	  and	  therefore	  attract	  the	  application	  of	  section	  
197.	  It	  can	  thus	  be	  clearly	  discerned	  from	  the	  discussion	  above	  that	  the	  facts	  of	  
the	   case,	   as	   seen	   in	   an	   objective	   light,	   will	   be	   determinative	   of	   whether	   the	  
particular	   entity	   can	   be	   typified	   as	   a	   business	   or	   a	   part	   thereof	   under	   section	  
197.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118Wallis	  (2000)	  op	  cit	  (n80).	  Also	  see	  Schutte	  v	  Powerplus	  Performance	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  
supra	  (n90).	  
119	  (1983)	  50	  di	  508.	  
120	  Hernandez	  v	  Vidal	  SA	  v	  Perez	  C-­‐127/96;	  Santner	  v	  Hoechst	  AG	  C-­‐229/96;	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4.3.1.3.	  A	  ‘going	  concern’:	  
In	   this	   section,	   attention	   will	   be	   paid	   to	   the	   last	   requirement	   of	   section	   197,	  
namely	   that	   of	   a	   going	   concern.	   It	   has	   been	   suggested	   that	   a	   ‘going	   concern’	  
refers	   to	   a	   situation	  where	   a	   business	  was	   transferred	   and	   subsequent	   to	   the	  
transfer,	  retained	  the	  same	  identity	  it	  had	  as	  before	  the	  transfer.121	  
	  
The	   identity	   of	   the	   enterprise	   is	   of	   paramount	   importance	   in	   this	   regard	   and	  
plays	   a	   central	   role	   as	   to	   the	   determination	   of	   whether	   a	   business	   has	   been	  
transferred	  as	  a	  ‘going	  concern’.	  The	  identity	  is	  composed	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  facets	  
such	   as:	   The	   employees,	   tangible	   assets	   like	   property,	  machinery,	   fixtures	   and	  
fittings,	  contracts,	  book	  debts,	  etc.	  Intangible	  assets	  such	  as	  patents,	  trademarks	  
and	   goodwill	   also	   form	   part	   of	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   ‘identity’.	   The	   principles	  
used	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  a	  ‘business	  or	  part	  thereof’	  has	  been	  transferred	  have	  
to	   be	   borne	   in	   mind	   at	   this	   stage.	   The	   particular	   relationship	   between	   the	  
employees	   and	   any	   assets	   used	   by	   them	   to	   fulfil	   their	   obligations	   in	   order	   to	  
further	  the	  objective	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  business	  needs	  to	  be	  cognised	  when	  it	  is	  
asked	   if	   the	   transferred	  business	  has	   retained	   it’s	   identity.122	  If	   the	  business	  or	  
part	  thereof	  comprised	  only	  of	  employees	  and	  human	  capital,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  
transferred	  as	  a	  going	  concern	  provided	  that	  it	  has	  retained	  its	  identity	  after	  the	  
transfer,	   regardless	   if	   assets	   where	   transferred	   along	   with	   the	   employees.	  
Conversely,	   if	  assets	  were	  needed	  by	  the	  employees	  to	  fulfil	  their	  functions,	  the	  
assets	  along	  with	  the	  employees	  will	  have	  to	  be	  transferred	  for	  the	  business	  to	  
retain	  its	  identity.	  123	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   determine	   if	   the	   business	   retained	   its	   identity,	   attention	   must	   be	  
drawn	  as	   to	  whether	   the	  new	  employer	  resumes	   the	  old	  employers	  operations	  
with	   the	   same	  or	   similar	   activities.	   In	   order	   to	   come	   to	   a	   conclusion	   as	   to	   this	  
question,	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  has	  laid	  down	  a	  non-­‐exhaustive	  list	  of	  criteria	  
that	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  cumulatively.	  In	  the	  NEHAWU	  decision	  the	  following	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  Van	  Niekerk	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  (n83).	  
122	  Bosch	  (2001)	  op	  cit	  (n115).	  
123	  In	   Schmidt	   v	   Spar	   und	   Leihkasse	   der	   Fruheren	   Amter	   Bordelsholm,	   Kiel	   und	  
Cronshagen	  [1994]	  IRLR	  302	  (ECJ),	  it	  was	  held	  that	  assets,	  although	  useful	  when	  
determining	   if	   a	   business	   was	   transferred	   as	   a	   ‘going	   concern’,	   is	   not	  
determinative,	   particularly	   where	   the	   business	   consisted	   of	   the	   provision	   of	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factors	   were	   held	   to	   be	   relevant:	   Whether	   or	   not	   assets,	   both	   tangible	   and	  
intangible	  were	   transferred;	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  workers	  are	   taken	  over	  by	   the	  
new	  employer;	  whether	  or	  not	  customers	  are	  transferred	  to	  the	  new	  employer;	  
and	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  new	  employer	  carries	  on	   the	  same	  business	  as	   the	  old	  
employer.	   The	   court	   also	   held	   that	   the	   application	   of	   these	   criteria	   would	   be	  
capable	  of	  aiding	  in	  the	  ascertainment	  of	  whether	  the	  business	  remains	  the	  same	  
but	   only	   in	   different	   hands,	   which	   is	   the	   ultimate	   question	   that	   needs	   to	   be	  
answered.124	  
	  
By	   having	   regard	   to	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   factors	   cumulatively,	   courts	   will	   be	  
able	   to	   get	   to	   the	   core	   and	   substance	   of	   transfer	   transactions	   so	   as	   to	   bring	  
simulated	   transactions	   designed	   to	   evade	   the	   effects	   of	   section	   197	   into	   its	  
purview.	   In	   the	   Kgethe	   v	   LMK	   Manufacturing	   (Pty)	   Ltd125 	  it	   was	   held	   that	  
regardless	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   parties	   only	   intended	   to	   transfer	   assets	   of	   the	  
transferors’	   business,	   the	   transaction	  was	   capable	  of	   falling	  under	   section	  197.	  
This	  conclusion	  was	  reached	  by	  having	  regard	  to	  factors	  like:	  The	  transferee	  took	  
possession	  of	  the	  transferor’s	  business	  premises;	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  transferee	  
continued	   with	   the	   operations	   of	   the	   transferor’s	   business	   as	   if	   there	   was	   no	  
change	   in	   the	   ownership	   of	   the	   business.	   On	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	  
business	   remained	   the	   same	   but	   in	   different	   hands.	   This	   judgement	   therefore	  
alludes,	   once	   again,	   to	   the	   willingness	   of	   our	   courts	   to	   adopt	   a	   purposive	  
approach	  when	  interpreting	  the	  provisions	  of	  section	  197.126	  	  
	  
The	   Labour	   court	   in	   the	   Schutte	   case	   confirmed	   this	   purposive	   approach.	   As	  
stated,	   the	   court	   held	   that	   the	   substance	   and	   not	   the	   form	   of	   the	   transaction	  
would	   be	   determinative	   of	   whether	   the	   transaction	   falls	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	  
section	   197.	   The	   court	   went	   on	   to	   state	   that	   in	   order	   to	   ascertain	   what	   the	  
substance	   of	   the	   transaction	   is,	   factors	   that	   are	   indicative	   of	   a	   transfer	   of	   a	  
business	  have	  to	  be	  weighed	  against	  those	  that	  are	  not.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124C	  Bosch	  ‘Balancing	  the	  Act:	  Fairness	  and	  Transfer	  of	  Businesses’	  (2004)	  ILJ	  
923.	  
125	  (1998)	  19	  ILJ	  524	  (LAC).	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  see	  Maloba	  v	  Minaco	  Stone	  Germiston	  
(Pty)	  Ltd	  (2000)	  21,	  ILJ,	  1795	  (LC).	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The	   cognised	   factors	   have	   to	   be	   rooted	   in	   the	   facts	   of	   the	   particular	   case	   and	  
must	  be	  evaluated	  on	  a	  cumulative	  and	  comprehensive	  basis.	  	  
	  
The	  British	  court’s	  decision	  in	  Kenmir	  v	  Frizzel127	  supports	  the	  decision	  delivered	  
in	  the	  Schutte	  case.	  Here	  it	  was	  held	  that	  regard	  must	  be	  had	  to	  the	  substance	  of	  
the	   transaction	   and	   that	   in	   order	   to	   address	   this	   question	   all	   factors	  must	   be	  
weighed	  cumulatively.	  For	  purposes	  of	  the	  court’s	  weighing	  exercise,	  factors	  that	  
pointed	   to	   the	   transfer	  of	   a	  business	  were	  weighed	  against	   those	   that	   erred	   in	  
the	  opposite	  direction.	  It	  was	  held	  that	  a	  business	  would	  have	  been	  transferred	  
as	  a	  going	  concern	  if	  the	  transferee	  were	  able	  to	  continue	  the	  business	  activities	  
of	  the	  transferor	  without	  interruption.	  	  The	  European	  courts	  have	  dealt	  with	  the	  
issue	  of	  a	  ‘going	  concern’	  in	  a	  similar	  fashion.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  for	  a	  business	  to	  be	  transferred	  as	  a	  going	  concern,	  the	  transferee	  must	  
receive	   an	   undertaking	   that	   enables	   it	   to	   continue	   with	   the	   same	   or	   similar	  
activities	   that	   the	   business	   conducted	   prior	   to	   the	   transfer.128The	   European	  
courts	  have	  also	   found	   the	   identity	  of	   the	   transferred	  entity	   subsequent	   to	   the	  
transfer	   as	   a	   conclusive	   criterion	   in	   addressing	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   a	  
business	  was	  transferred	  as	  a	  going	  concern.129	  
	  
The	   approach	   followed	   by	   the	   Canadian	   courts	   strikes	   consonance	   with	   the	  
approaches	  followed	  by	  the	  European	  and	  British	  courts.	  	  The	  Canadian	  position	  
is	   to	  have	  regard	  to	  the	   identity	  of	   the	  entity	  transferred.	  Here	  too,	  attention	   is	  
drawn	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   business	   retained	   substantial	   continuity	   of	   its	  
operations,	   as	   before	   the	   transfer.130	  With	   regards	   to	   outsourcing	   transactions,	  
section	  197	  will	  be	  applicable	  if	  the	  part	  of	  the	  business	  that	  was	  subject	  to	  the	  
transfer	   was	   transferred	   as	   a	   going	   concern.	   This	   will	   be	   the	   case	   if	   the	  
identifiable	   and	   severable	   part	   of	   business	   that	   was	   transferred,	   retained	   it’s	  
identity	  after	   the	   transfer	   to	   the	   transferee.	  Questions	   like	  continuity	  will	   large	  
loom	  and	  stand	  to	  be	  addressed	  by	  taking	  the	  factors	  mentioned	  in	  the	  NEHAWU	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  [1968]	  1	  All	  ER	  (HL).	  
128	  Bosch	  (2001)op	  cit	  (n115).	  
129	  Schmidt	  v	  Spar	  und	  Leihkasse	  der	  Fruheren	  Amter	  Bordelsholm,	  Kiel	  und	  
Cronshagen	  SUPRA	  (n97).	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decision	   into	   consideration.	   As	   stated,	   most	   instances	   of	   outsourcing	  
transactions	  stand	  to	  attract	  the	  application	  of	  section	  197.131	  
	  
What	   appears	   to	   be	   problematic	   however,	   is	   second-­‐generation	   outsourcing	  
transactions.	   When	   an	   undertaking	   is	   transferred	   in	   a	   first-­‐generation	  
outsourcing	   transaction,	   the	  part	  of	   the	  business	   that	   is	   subject	   to	   the	   transfer	  
will	  be	  deemed	  to	  have	  been	  transferred	  by	  the	  outsourcing	  employer	  to	  the	  new	  
employer.	   This	  means	   that	   in	   order	   for	   a	   second-­‐generation	   transaction	   to	   fall	  
within	   the	   ambit	   of	   section	   197,	   the	   transferor	   would	   also	   have	   to	   transfer	   a	  
business	  or	  a	  part	  thereof	  to	  the	  new	  transferee	  as	  a	  going	  concern.	  The	  positions	  
and	  methods	  that	  courts	  use	  to	  determine	  if	  a	  transfer	  attracts	  the	  application	  of	  
section	  197	  will	  therefore	  have	  to	  be	  applied	  ipso	  facto	  to	  the	  second-­‐generation	  
outsourcing	  transaction	  so	  as	  to	  come	  to	  a	  finding	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  section	  
197.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  a	  ‘going	  concern’,	  the	  part	  of	  a	  business	  
that	   was	   initially	   outsourced	   by	   the	   first	   employer	   must	   retain	   its	   identity	   as	  
before	   the	   transfer	   to	  enjoy	   the	  application	  of	  section	  197.	  Similarly,	   the	  entity	  
transferred	   by	   the	   second	   transferor	   must	   retain	   the	   same	   identity	   that	   it	  
enjoyed	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   it,	   before	   section	   197	   will	   be	   applied	   to	   the	   second-­‐
generation	  transaction.	  	  This	  means	  that	  although	  a	  service	  or	  part	  of	  a	  business	  
is	  identifiable	  and	  severable	  from	  the	  ‘main’	  entity,	  its	  identity	  must	  remain	  the	  
same	  as	  before	  the	  transfer	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  apply	  the	  provisions	  of	  section	  
197	  to	  it.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  determine	  if	  a	  business	  was	  transferred	  as	  a	  going	  concern	  in	  
second-­‐generation	   outsourcing	   transactions,	   seeing	   as	   the	   transferees	   of	  
outsourced	  businesses	  are	  capable	  of	  altering	  the	  identity	  or	  composition	  of	  the	  
businesses	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  section	  197	  will	  not	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  applied	  to	  
the	  transaction.	  	  
	  
Consider	  the	  following	  example:	  Party	  1	  outsources	  its	  cleaning	  services	  to	  Party	  
2	   by	   virtue	   of	   an	   agreement	   to	   that	   effect.	   Upon	   the	   expiration	   of	   2	   years	   the	  
agreement	   lapses.	   Party	   1	   then	   decides	   to	   allow	   Party	   3	   to	   continue	   with	   its	  
cleaning	  services,	  however,	  Party	  3	  only	  receives	  2	  of	   the	  employees	  employed	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by	  Party	  2	  to	  perform	  the	  cleaning	  services.	  The	  question	  now	  arises	  of	  whether	  
a	  transfer	  has	  occurred	  between	  Party	  2	  and	  Party	  3.	  If	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  
employees	  were	  involved	  in	  rendering	  the	  cleaning	  services	  to	  Party	  1,	  then	  the	  
transaction	  will	  not	  constitute	  a	  transfer	  as	  contemplated	  by	  section	  197.	  This	  is	  
because	   a	   part	   of	   a	   business	   has	   not	   been	   transferred	   to	   Party	   3	   as	   a	   going	  
concern.	  The	  part	  of	  the	  business	  has	  not	  retained	  the	  same	  identity	  it	  had	  before	  
the	  transfer.	  The	  part	  of	  the	  business	  was	  composed	  of	  a	  particular	  service	  to	  be	  
rendered,	   along	  with	   the	   employees	   that	  were	   responsible	   for	   rendering	   those	  
services.	  In	  the	  present	  example,	  Party	  3	  would	  have	  to	  appoint	  more	  employees	  
to	  fulfil	  the	  functions	  and	  render	  the	  same	  services	  as	  before	  the	  transaction.	  The	  
only	  thing	  that	  has	  been	  transferred	  is	  the	  right	  to	  render	  the	  cleaning	  services,	  
but	  no	  business,	  and	  not	  as	  a	  going	  concern.	  	  
	  
The	   European	   courts	   have	   heavily	   scrutinised	   second-­‐generation	   outsourcing	  
transactions.132In	  Oy	   Liikenne	   AB	   Liskojärvi	   and	   Juntunen133the	   court	   held	   that	  
the	  mere	   transfer	   of	   a	   service	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   constitute	   the	   transfer	   of	   an	  
‘economic	  entity’.	  In	  Aviation	  Union	  of	  South	  Africa	  v	  SA	  Airways	  (Pty)134	  the	  court	  
held	  that	  in	  order	  to	  constitute	  a	  transfer	  as	  a	  going	  concern,	  components	  of	  the	  
original	  business	  must	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  third	  party.	  This	  will	  not	  be	  the	  case	  
where	  a	  service	  provider	  is	  divested	  of	  the	  right	  to	  provide	  a	  particular	  service.	  
In	   such	   an	   instance,	   the	   service	   provider	   retains	   its	   business	   and	   is	   therefore	  
capable	  of	  providing	  the	  same	  services	  to	  different	  clients.	  
	  
The	   ultimate	   question	   of	   whether	   a	   business	   has	   been	   transferred	   as	   a	   going	  
concern	  will	  rest	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  each	  case	  and	  falls	  to	  be	  decided	  by	  the	  courts	  on	  
an	  objective	  and	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.135	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  Van	  Niekerk	  (2012)	  op	  cit	  (n83).	  
133	  [2001]	  IRLR	  171	  (ECJ).	  
134	  Supra	  (n111).	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4.3.1.4.	  The	  underlying	  purpose	  of	  section	  197:	  
	  Section	  3	   of	   the	   Labour	  Relations	  Act	   stipulates	   that	   the	  provisions	   of	   the	  Act	  
must	   be	   interpreted	   in	   a	   purposive	   approach	   that	   is	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  
Constitution	  and	   the	  rules	  of	  public	   international	   law.	  This	  ultimately	  obligates	  
courts	  to	  take	  cognisance	  of	  the	  policies	  that	  underlie	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  act.136	  
	  
The	  purpose	  and	  policy	   that	  underlies	   the	  enactment	  of	   section	  197	   should	  be	  
apparent	   at	   this	   stage.	   Although	   various	   interests	   are	   safeguarded	   by	   the	  
provisions	   of	   section	   197,	   two	   are	   of	   a	   central	   importance.	   Firstly,	   that	   of	  
employee	  protection	   in	   transfer	   transactions,	   and	   secondly,	   securing	   economic	  
development.	   	  The	  Constitutional	  Court	  has	  held	   that	  a	  balance	  must	  be	  struck	  
between	  those	  interests	  mentioned.137Regardless	  of	  what	  has	  been	  stated	  above,	  
the	  courts	  have	  gone	  about	  in	  interpreting	  section	  197	  in	  an	  expansive	  fashion	  so	  
as	   to	  afford	  affected	  employees	  protection	   in	   transfer	   transactions.	  This	  can	  be	  
seen	   in	   seen	   in	   the	  NEHAWU,	  Schutte,	  Thekwini,	  Aviation	  Union	  of	   South	  Africa	  
and	  Pexies	  decisions	  respectively.	  	  
	  
The	   judgements	   handed	   down	   by	   the	   South	   African	   courts	   seem	   to	   strike	  
consonance	  with	  those	  of	  the	  European	  and	  British	  courts.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  
if	  one	  considers	  that	  section	  197	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  TUPE	  and	  Acquired	  Rights	  
Directive.	  The	  courts	  in	  the	  European	  jurisdictions	  also	  seem	  to	  err	  in	  favour	  of	  
employee	   protection,	   resulting	   in	   an	   expansive	   interpretation	   of	   the	   relevant	  
transfer	   provisions.138The	   policy	   underlying	   section	   197	   will	   therefore	   be	   the	  
key	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  provisions	  of	  section	  197	  can	  be	  stretched	  so	  
as	   to	   include	   the	   termination	   and	   transfer	   of	   franchise	   agreements	   within	   its	  
purview.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  Blackie	  (1999)	  op	  cit	  (73).	  
137	  NEHAWU	  v	  University	  of	  Cape	  Town	  supra	  (n103).	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5.	  PE	  Pack	  4100	  CC	  v	  Adam	  Sanders	  and	  Others:139	  
5.1.	  Introduction:	  
In	  this	  section	  the	  PE	  Pack	  judgement	  will	  be	  evaluated	  in	  order	  to	  asses	  whether	  
section	   197	   of	   the	   Labour	   Relations	   Act	   is	   applicable	   to	   the	   termination	   and	  
transfer	  of	  franchise	  agreements.	  The	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  and	  finding	  of	  the	  courts	  
will	  be	  discussed	  first,	  after	  which	  attention	  will	  be	  drawn	  to	  the	  jurisprudence	  
pertaining	  to	  section	  197	  through	  which	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  judgement	  will	  be	  
viewed.	  
5.2.	  The	  Facts:	  
Cell	   C	   is	   a	   franchisor	   specialising	   in	   the	   sale	   of	   airtime,	   cell	   phones	   and	  
accessories,	   and	   concluding	   and	   renewing	   various	   contracts	   that	   relate	   to	  
business	   in	   the	   market	   of	   telecommunications.	   Cell	   C	   used	   franchising	   as	   a	  
vehicle	  for	  expanding	  its	  business	  network.	  	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   effect	   the	   franchising	   of	   its	   operations	   business	   format	   franchises	  
were	  used.140Cell	   C	   had	   entered	   into	   a	   franchise	   agreement	  with	   the	   third	   and	  
fourth	  (the	  old	   franchisee)	  respondents	  which	  agreement	  was	  cancelled	  on	   the	  
30th	  of	  April	  2010.	  Subsequent	  to	  the	  cancellation	  a	  new	  agreement	  was	  entered	  
into	   between	   Cell	   C	   and	   the	   appellants	   (the	   new	   franchisee)	  which	   agreement	  
took	   effect	   on	   the	   1st	   of	  May	   2010.	   The	   termination	   of	   the	   agreement	   and	   the	  
conclusion	   of	   a	   new	   one	  was	   the	  movement	   that	   set	   into	  motion	   the	   chain	   of	  
events	  that	  built	  up	  to	  the	  dispute.	  A	  dispute	  had	  arisen	  between	  an	  employee	  in	  
the	  employ	  of	  the	  old	  franchisee	  and	  Cell	  C	  regarding	  the	  applicability	  of	  section	  
197	  of	  the	  LRA.	  The	  employee	  contended	  that	  its	  contract	  of	  employment	  would	  
be	   automatically	   transferred	   to	   the	   Appellant	   by	   virtue	   of	   section	   197.	   Cell	   C	  
contested	  this	  by	  denying	  the	  application	  of	  section	  197	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  they	  
were	   not	   buying	   back	   the	   franchise	   from	   the	   old	   franchisee	   but	   merely	  
terminating	  the	  agreement	  and	  transferring	  it	  to	  a	  new	  franchisee.	  
	  
The	   crisp	   question	   that	   the	   courts	   were	   requested	   to	   decide	   was	   whether	   a	  
transfer	  of	  a	  business	  as	  envisaged	  by	  section	  197	  had	  occurred.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  Supra	  (n4).	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If	  this	  question	  were	  answered	  in	  the	  affirmative	  the	  employment	  contract	  of	  the	  
employee	  would	  have	  been	  transferred	  to	  the	  new	  franchisee	  pursuant	  to	  which	  
it	  would	  be	  in	  the	  employ	  of	  the	  new	  franchisee.	  
5.3.	  The	  Labour	  Court:	  
De	  Swardt	  AJ	  found	  that	  section	  197	  of	  the	  Labour	  Relations	  Act	  was	  applicable	  
to	   the	   termination	   and	   transfer	   of	   a	   franchise	   agreement.	   In	   coming	   to	   his	  
conclusion	  he	  used	  the	  ‘snapshot	  test’	  created	  by	  Francis	  J.141	  This	  test	  holds	  that	  
a	  snapshot	  be	  taken	  of	  the	  business	  subject	  to	  the	  transfer	  before	  and	  after	  the	  
transfer.	   If	   the	   business	   remained	   substantially	   the	   same	   after	   the	   transfer	   it	  
would	  be	  possible	  to	  find	  that	  a	  transfer	  as	  a	  going	  concern	  had	  in	  fact	  occurred.	  
	  
In	   applying	   the	   test,	   it	  was	   found	   that	   a	   business	   similar	   to	   that	   as	   before	   the	  
transfer	   remained	   thereafter.	   Both	   before	   and	   after	   the	   transfer	   customers	  
would	   find	  an	  outlet	   selling	  cell	  phone	  contracts,	  airtime	  and	  where	  customers	  
could	  bring	  their	  cell	  phones	   for	  repairs.	  Further,	   the	  business	  remained	   in	   the	  
same	   place,	   the	   telephone	   number	   remained	   the	   same	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
business	  remained	  the	  same.	  All	  that	  was	  different	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  were	  a	  
few	  new	  faces	  behind	  the	  counter.	  
	  
In	   coming	   to	   his	   finding	   De	   Swardt	   AJ	   relied	   on	   those	   judgments	   calling	   for	   a	  
purposive	   interpretation	   of	   section	   197.	   In	   order	   to	   support	   his	   contentions,	  
reference	   was	   made	   to	   the	   decision	   between	   NEHAWU	   v	   University	   of	   Cape	  
Town.142	  As	   stated,	   the	   underlying	   purpose	   of	   section	   197	   is	   aimed	   to	   protect	  
workers	  against	  the	  loss	  of	  employment	  in	  the	  event	  of	  the	  transfer	  of	  a	  business	  
and	  to	  facilitate	  the	  sale	  of	  businesses	  as	  going	  concerns.	  Reference	  was	  further	  
made	   to	   the	  decision	  of	   Zondo	   JP	   in	  Aviation	  Union	  of	  SA	  on	  behalf	  of	  Barnes	  &	  
Others	   v	   SA	  Airways	   (Pty)	  Ltd143	  where	   it	  was	   held	   that	   the	   purpose	   of	   section	  
197	  would	   not	   be	   served	   by	   an	   interpretation	   that	   entails	   that	   the	   employees	  
moving	  with	  the	  work	  lose	  their	  jobs.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	  FAWU	  v	  The	  Cold	  Chain	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  (1020)	  1	  BLLR	  49	  (LC).	  
142	  Supra	  (n103).	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As	   regards	   second	   generation	  outsourcing,	  De	   Swardt	  AJ	   held	   that	   it	  would	  be	  
destructive	   to	   the	   purposes	   of	   section	   197	   if	   second	   generation	   outsourcing	  
would	  not	  be	  included	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  section	  197.	  
	  
He	  juxtaposed	  the	  purposive	  approach	  with	  an	  approach	  calling	  for	  the	  words	  to	  
be	  given	  their	  literal	  meaning	  in	  order	  to	  come	  to	  a	  finding	  as	  to	  which	  approach	  
better	   served	   the	   purpose	   of	   section	   197.	   It	   was	   held	   that	   upon	   the	   literal	  
interpretation	   a	   transfer	   would	   not	   have	   occurred.	   All	   that	   would	   have	   taken	  
place	   would	   have	   been	   a	   termination	   of	   the	   franchise	   agreement	   and	   the	  
conclusion	   of	   a	   new	   one.	   According	   to	   De	   Swardt	   AJ,	   this	   would	   have	   been	  
contrary	   to	  and	  defeated	  the	  purpose	  of	  section	  197	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	   fact	   that	  
the	   jobs	   of	   the	   employees	  would	  not	   be	   safeguarded.	   Such	   an	   approach	  would	  
neither	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  right	  to	  fair	  labour	  practices	  nor	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  
the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Act.	  
	  
What	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   he	   equates	   the	   termination	   and	  
transfer	   of	   a	   franchise	   agreement	  with	   an	   outsourcing	   transaction.	   It	  was	  held	  
that	  when	  Cell	  C	  entered	  into	  the	  franchise	  agreement	  with	  the	  franchisee	  it	  was	  
outsourcing	  its	  business	  to	  the	  franchisee	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  conduct	  the	  business	  
on	  behalf	  of	   the	   franchisor.	  This	  placed	   the	  particular	   case	  within	   the	  ambit	  of	  
the	   outsourcing	   jurisprudence	   and	   therefore	   allowed	   the	   provisions	   of	   section	  
197	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  particular	  case.	  This	  is	  correct	  if	  one	  considers	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	   outsourcing	   transactions	   have	   been	   included	   in	   the	   purview	   of	   section	  
197.	  
5.4.	  The	  Labour	  Appeal	  Court:	  
From	  the	  outset	  it	  has	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  court	  was	  divided	  in	  its	  judgment.	  The	  
findings	  of	   the	  court	  will	   therefore	  be	  discussed	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  majority	  and	  
minority	   judgments	  respectively.	  The	  decision	  of	  the	  majority	  will	  be	  discussed	  
first.	  
	  
The	  majority	   (Davis	   J)	   of	   the	   court	   found	   section	  197	   inapplicable	   to	   franchise	  
agreements.	   It	  was	  held	   that	  Cell	  C	  was	  merely	  using	   its	   right	   to	   terminate	   the	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This	  meant	  that	  the	  old	  franchisee	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  allowed	  to	  operate	  their	  
business	  within	   the	   framework	  of	   that	   provided	   for	   by	  Cell	   C.	   It	  was	  held	   that	  
when	   Cell	   C	   entered	   into	   a	   new	   franchise	   agreement	  with	   the	   new	   franchisee	  
subsequent	   to	   the	   termination	   of	   the	   agreement	   between	   it	   and	   the	   old	  
franchisee,	   it	   could	   not	   be	   said	   that	   a	   business	   was	   transferred	   as	   a	   going	  
concern	  from	  the	  old	  franchisee	  to	  the	  new	  franchisee.	  Crucial	  to	  this	  finding	  was	  
the	   fact	   that	   Cell	   C,	   the	   franchisor,	   held	   the	   core	   assets	   of	   the	   business	   both	  
before	  and	  after	  the	  agreement.	  Because	  the	  assets	  remained	  vested	  in	  Cell	  C	  no	  
business	  was	  capable	  of	  being	  transferred.	  	  
	  
If	  regard	  is	  had	  to	  the	  three	  requirements	  necessary	  for	  the	  application	  of	  section	  
197,	   it	  can	  be	  elucidated	  from	  the	  majority	   judgment	  that	  the	  requirement	  of	  a	  
‘transfer’	  as	  stipulated	  in	  section	  197	  has	  not	  taken	  place.	  Because	  there	  was	  no	  
transfer	   it	   was	   unnecessary	   to	   enquire	   as	   to	   whether	   a	   business	   had	   been	  
transferred	  as	  a	  going	  concern.	  
	  
Davis	   J	   rejected	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   termination	   and	   transfer	   of	   a	   franchise	  
agreement	   was	   capable	   of	   being	   equated	   with	   an	   outsourcing,	   particularly	   a	  
second-­‐generation	  outsourcing	  agreement.	   In	   support	  of	   this	   contention	   it	  was	  
argued	   before	   the	   court	   that	   the	   termination	   of	   a	   franchise	   agreement	   was	  
similar	  to	  the	  facts	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  in	  Carlito	  
Abler	   and	   others	   v	   Sodexho	  MM	   Catering	   Gesselschaft	   GmBH.144	  This	   judgement	  
dealt	  with	   a	   second-­‐generation	   outsourcing	   transaction.	   In	   this	   case	   a	   hospital	  
entered	  into	  an	  agreement	  with	  a	  catering	  company	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  meals	  and	  
beverages.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  agreement	  the	  hospital	  allowed	  the	  catering	  company	  
to	   use	   its	   premises	   and	   certain	   appurtenances.	   The	   hospital	   terminated	   this	  
agreement	   and	   entered	   into	   a	   similar	   agreement	   with	   a	   different	   catering	  
company.	  The	  court	   found	  that	   the	  Acquired	  Rights	  Directive	  was	  applicable	   to	  
the	  case.	  
	  
In	   jettisoning	   the	   argument	   the	   court	   placed	   reliance	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
business	   model	   underlying	   franchising.	   This	   allowed	   the	   court	   to	   be	   able	   to	  
distinguish	  between	  the	  Carlito	  Abler	  decision	  and	  the	  termination	  and	  transfer	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of	  franchising	  agreements.	  The	  court	  distinguished	  between	  the	  cases	  by	  finding	  
that	  a	   franchise	  agreement	  gives	  rise	   to	  a	   joint	  venture	  between	  the	   franchisor	  
and	   the	   franchisee.	   When	   the	   franchise	   agreement	   comes	   to	   an	   end	   the	   joint	  
venture	  comes	  to	  an	  end	  and	  a	  new	  joint	  venture	  comes	  into	  being	  between	  the	  
franchisor	   and	   the	   new	   franchisee	   when	   the	   new	   franchise	   agreement	   is	  
concluded.	  Because	  of	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  joint	  venture	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  
new	  one	  there	  could	  be	  no	  transfer	  in	  terms	  of	  section	  197.	  If	  this	  were	  not	  the	  
case	  the	  termination	  of	  franchise	  agreements	  would	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  equated	  
with	   second-­‐generation	   outsourcing	   transactions	   that	   fall	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	  
section	  197.	  
	  
As	   mentioned	   there	   was	   a	   discord	   between	   the	   presiding	   officers	   as	   to	   the	  
applicability	  of	  section	  197	  to	  franchise	  agreements.	  In	  his	  dissenting	  judgment	  
Landman	   J	   came	   to	   a	   different	   finding	   as	   the	  majority.	   He	   found	   that	   a	   stable	  
economic	  entity	  changes	  hands	  when	  a	  franchise	  agreement	  is	  terminated.	  This	  
conclusion	   was	   drawn	   from	   the	   purpose	   against	   which	   section	   197	   serves	   to	  
operate.	   Particular	   reliance	   was	   placed	   on	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   Constitutional	  
Court	  in	  NEHAWU	  v	  University	  of	  Cape	  Town.145Crucial	  to	  this	  is	  the	  statement	  by	  
the	   court	   in	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   decision	   that	  workers	   need	   to	   be	   protected	  
from	  unemployment	  in	  transfer	  transactions	  and	  that	  this	  objective	  needs	  to	  be	  
met	  in	  both	  substance	  and	  in	  form.	  	  
	  
The	   dissenting	   judgment	   reads	   to	   mean	   that	   if	   the	   requirements	   for	   the	  
application	  of	  section	  197	  are	   interpreted	   in	   the	   light	  of	   the	  purpose	   for	  which	  
the	  section	  was	  enacted	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  conclude	  that	  section	  197	  is	  applicable	  to	  
franchise	  agreements.	  	  
	  
With	   regards	   to	   the	   requirement	  of	  a	   ‘transfer’	  by	  one	  employer	   to	  another	  he	  
found	  that	  there	  was	  an	  indirect	  one	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  franchisor	  fulfilled	  the	  
role	  of	  conduit	  between	  the	  old	  and	  new	  franchisees.	  As	  for	  the	  requirement	  of	  a	  
‘going	  concern’	   it	  was	  concluded	  that	   the	   identity	  of	   the	  business	  remained	  the	  
same	   subsequent	   to	   the	   transfer	   regardless	   of	  whether	   tangible	   assets	   formed	  
part	  of	   the	  transfer.	   In	  addressing	  this	  requirement	   it	  was	  considered	  what	  the	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old	  franchisee	  would	  be	  divested	  of	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  franchise	  
agreement.	   On	   this	   point	   it	   was	   found	   that	   the	   old	   franchisee	   would	   not	   take	  
anything	   away	   so	   as	   to	   be	   able	   to	   continue	   its	   business	   as	   it	   did	   before	   the	  
transfer.	  In	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  able	  to	  continue	  with	  its	  business	  it	  would	  have	  to	  
enter	  into	  a	  new	  agreement	  with	  a	  different	  franchisor.	  Restraints	  of	  trade	  thus	  
loomed	  large	  in	  this	  instance	  as	  it	  generally	  does	  on	  the	  sphere	  of	  franchising.	  
	  
	  It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   the	   perspective	   from	   which	   he	   views	   the	  
termination	  and	  transfer	  of	   franchise	  agreements	  differ	  greatly	  from	  that	  taken	  
by	  Davis	   J.	  Although	  both	   judges	  accept	   that	   the	  starting	  point	   in	  any	   franchise	  
relationship	   is	   the	  business	  of	   the	   franchisor,	   they	  differ	   as	   to	   the	   effect	  of	   the	  
granting	  of	  a	  franchise	  by	  a	  franchisor.	  This	  is	  the	  invariable	  foundation	  for	  the	  
divergence	   of	   their	   findings.	   For	   Davis	   J	   the	   granting	   of	   a	   franchise	   by	   a	  
franchisor	  is	  a	  mere	  allowance	  for	  the	  business	  of	  a	  franchisee	  to	  be	  plugged	  into	  
the	  framework	  provided	  for	  by	  the	  franchisor.	  Due	  to	  this	  the	  franchisor	  remains	  
vested	   with	   core	   assets	   of	   the	   franchise,	   and	   hence,	   when	   the	   agreement	   is	  
terminated	  there	  can	  be	  no	  transfer	  because	  the	  franchisor	  has	  remained	  vested	  
with	  the	  assets	  at	  all	  times.	  For	  Landman	  J	  the	  granting	  of	  a	  franchise	  agreement	  
means	  the	  transfer	  and	  divestment	  of	  a	  part	  of	  franchisors	  business.	  Because	  the	  
conclusion	   of	   the	   franchise	   agreement	   includes	   the	   transfer	   of	   a	   part	   of	   a	  
business,	  the	  transaction	  is	  brought	  into	  the	  purview	  of	  section	  197.	  This	  could	  
be	  seen	  as	  the	  inverse	  of	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  franchisee	  is	  merely	  plugging	  into	  
the	  framework	  of	  the	  franchisor	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  agreement.	  
5.5.	  The	  majority	  and	  minority	  judgments	  of	  the	  Labour	  Appeal	  Court	  in	  the	  light	  
of	  section	  197	  of	  the	  LRA:	  
This	   section	   will	   comprise	   of	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   majority	   and	   minority	  
judgments	   through	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   jurisprudence	   pertaining	   to	   section	  
197.	  The	  objective	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  judgment	  handed	  
down	  by	  Davis	  J	  or	  Landman	  J	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  objective	  and	  purpose	  of	  
section	  197.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  contended	  that	  not	  only	  does	  Davis	  J	  and	  Landman	  J	  differ	  as	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  
the	  conclusion	  of	  a	  franchise	  agreement,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  interpretation	  that	  needs	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stands	   to	   attract	   the	   application	   of	   section	   197.	   With	   regard	   to	   the	   majority	  
judgment	   there	   are	   two	   obstacles	   that	   prevent	   the	   termination	   of	   franchise	  
agreements	  from	  passing	  the	  litmus	  test	  in	  order	  for	  the	  consequences	  of	  section	  
197	  to	  ensue.	  Firstly	  the	  court	  held	  that	  there	  was	  no	  transfer	  as	  is	  envisaged	  by	  
section	  197.	  Secondly	  the	  court	  found	  the	  given	  case	  incomparable	  to	  a	  second-­‐
generation	  outsourcing	  transaction.	  The	  requirements	  contained	  in	  section	  197	  
must	  be	  understood	  against	  the	  backdrop	  and	  purpose	  for	  which	  the	  section	  was	  
enacted;	   namely	   employee	   protection.	   A	   purposive	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
provisions	  of	  section	  197	  requires	  that	  protection	  be	  given	  to	  employees	  in	  those	  
instances	   not	   specifically	   enunciated	   in	   section	   197.	   As	   stated	   this	   has	   led	  
outsourcing	   and	   second-­‐generation	   outsourcing	   transactions	   to	   fall	   within	   the	  
ambit	  of	  section	  197.	  
	  
Davis	  J	  found	  that	  when	  the	  franchise	  agreement	  was	  terminated	  the	  franchisor	  
was	  merely	  exercising	  a	  contractual	  right	  to	  that	  effect.	  The	  reasoning	  that	  led	  to	  
this	  finding	  is	  derivative	  of	  a	  literal	  interpretation	  of	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  and	  the	  
application	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  section	  197	  thereto.	  As	  was	  stated	  by	  De	  Swardt	  
AJ,	   when	   a	   literal	   approach	   is	   taken	   to	   the	   provisions	   of	   section	   197,	   the	  
franchisor	  was	  just	  exercising	  a	  right	  to	  cancel	  the	  contract.	  Being	  a	  contractual	  
right	  to	  cancel	  the	  contract	  it	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  the	  application	  of	  section	  197	  
should	  not	  be	  triggered.	  However,	  this	  is	  in	  direct	  conflict	  with	  what	  is	  required	  
when	  section	  197	  stands	  to	  be	   interpreted.	   It	   is	  accepted	  that	  upon	  following	  a	  
literalist	  approach	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  transfer	  the	  termination	  and	  transfer	  of	  a	  
franchise	   agreement	   does	   not	   deserve	   to	   enjoy	   the	   application	   of	   the	   section.	  
This	   would	   however	   be	   an	   ignorance	   of	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   section.	   Having	  
regard	   to	   the	   underlying	   purpose	   of	   section	   197	   and	   the	   jurisprudence	  
surrounding	   it	   makes	   it	   possible	   to	   stretch	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   transfer	   so	   as	   to	  
include	  the	  transaction	  under	  consideration.	  
	  
The	   termination	   of	   a	   franchise	   agreement	   is	   arguably	   more	   complex	   than	   it	  
appears	   from	   face	   of	   it.	   It	   is	   not	   simply	   the	   exercise	   of	   a	   contractual	   right	   as	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In	  Schutte	  v	  Powerplus	  Performance146	  it	  was	  held	  that	  regard	  must	  be	  had	  to	  the	  
substance	  of	  a	  transaction	  when	  it	  is	  asked	  whether	  the	  provisions	  of	  section	  197	  
is	  capable	  of	  being	  applied	  to	  a	  particular	  case.	  Having	  regard	  to	  the	  substance	  of	  
the	   transaction	  will	   serve	   as	   the	   key	   to	   the	  question	  of	  whether	   the	  particular	  
transaction	  falls	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  section	  197.	  This	  is	  a	  useful	  foundation	  from	  
which	   to	   depart	   in	   addressing	   the	   question	   as	   to	   whether	   a	   ‘transfer’	   had	  
occurred.	  	  The	  two	  parts	  that	  comprise	  the	  transaction	  under	  consideration	  must	  
be	  understood	   in	   the	   light	   of	   and	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  objective	  of	   section	  197.	  The	  
first	   part	   of	   the	   transaction	   consists	   of	   the	   termination	   of	   the	   franchise	  
agreement	  while	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  transaction	  comprises	  of	  the	  conclusion	  
of	  a	  new	  franchise	  agreement	  between	  the	  franchisor	  and	  the	  new	  franchisee.	  	  
	  
As	  regards	   the	  substance	  of	   the	   transaction,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	  a	   right	   to	  operate	  a	  
Cell	  C	  franchise	  held	  by	  the	  third	  and	  fourth	  respondents(the	  old	  franchisee)	  was	  
terminated.	  This	  right	  formed	  the	  foundation	  for	  their	  business	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
franchise.	   This	  was	   not	   all,	   however;	   after	   the	   termination	   the	   new	   franchisee	  
acquired	  the	  right	  to	  operate	  the	  same	  business	  from	  the	  same	  premises	  and	  in	  
the	  same	  form	  namely	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  franchise.	  The	  change	  of	  franchisees	  took	  
place	  in	  a	  seamless	  manner.	  	  
	  
If	   regard	   is	   had	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   a	   franchise	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   contend	   that	   a	  
franchise	  consists	  of	  two	  components.	  The	  first	  component	  is	  the	  independently	  
owned	   business	   of	   the	   franchisee.	   Secondly	   there	   are	   the	   intellectual	   property	  
rights	  provided	  by	  the	  franchisor	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  franchise	  agreement.147	  One	  of	  
the	   reasons	   that	   a	   franchisee	   would	   choose	   to	   buy	   a	   franchise	   is	   so	   that	   its	  
independently	  owned	  business	  can	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  franchisors	  trade	  and	  
service	   marks. 148 The	   above-­‐mentioned	   components	   are	   essential	   to	   the	  
existence	   of	   a	   franchise.	   Without	   the	   right	   to	   use	   and	   be	   associated	   with	   the	  
business	  model	  of	   the	   franchisor	  there	  would	  be	  no	  franchise.	  The	  effect	  of	   the	  
termination	  of	  a	   franchise	  agreement	   is	  essentially	  to	  divest	  the	  franchisee	  of	  a	  
part	   of	   its	   business	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   agreement	   in	   terms	   of	   which	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  Supra	  (n90).	  
147	  See	  section	  2.1.1.	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franchisee	  enjoys	  the	  right	  to	  use	  and	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  business	  model	  of	  
the	  franchisor	  will	  be	  terminated.	  This	  was	  confirmed	  by	  Davis	  J.	  Support	  for	  this	  
can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  goodwill	  of	  the	  franchise	  and	  the	  assets	  used	  to	  
further	  the	  business	  of	  the	  franchise	  remain	  with	  the	  franchisor.	  This	  contention	  
is	   strengthened	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   franchisee	  will	   ordinarily	  be	   restrained	   from	  
pursuing	  a	  similar	  trade	  for	  a	  period	  subsequent	  to	  the	  termination.149	  
	  
Following	  a	  purposive	  approach	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  transfer	  requires	  that	  the	  
net	  be	  cast	  as	  wide	  as	  possible	   to	  bring	   transactions	  not	   initially	  contemplated	  
within	   the	   purview	   of	   section	   197.	  What	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  
Davis	   J	   was	   a	   proponent	   for	   the	   inclusion	   of	   second-­‐generation	   outsourcing	  
within	  the	  ambit	  of	  section	  197.	  He	  was	  a	  presiding	  officer	  in	  what	  can	  arguably	  
be	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘transfer’,	  as	  envisaged	  by	  
section	  197,	  was	  stretched	  to	  have	  the	  widest	  meaning	  possible;	  namely	  Aviation	  
Union	  of	  South	  Africa	  v	  SA	  Airways	  (Pty)	  Ltd.	  	  
	  
In	   this	  particular	   case	   the	   court	   interpreted	   the	   transfer	   of	   a	   business	   ‘by’	   one	  
employer	   to	  another	   to	   include	  a	   transfer	  of	  a	  business	   ‘from’	  one	  employer	   to	  
another.	   This	  made	   the	   section	   applicable	   to	   a	   second-­‐generation	   outsourcing	  
transaction	   where	   there	   was	   no	   contractual	   link	   between	   the	   transferor	   and	  
transferee	  employers	  respectively.	  Zondo	  J	  stated	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  section	  197	  
would	  be	   frustrated	   if	   the	  word	   ‘by’	  was	   to	  be	  given	   its	  ordinary	  meaning.	   If	   it	  
were	   interpreted	   in	   accordance	   with	   its	   ordinary	   meaning,	   the	   section	   would	  
only	  be	  applicable	  to	  first-­‐generation	  outsourcing	  transactions	  and	  would	  leave	  
those	  employees	  who	  need	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  Act	  the	  most	  unprotected.	  
	  
Although	   the	   core	  assets	   remain	  vested	   in	   the	   franchisor,	   there	   is	  a	   transfer	  of	  
the	  right	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  of	  the	  franchisor.	  
This	   right	  will	   be	   transferred	   from	   the	  old	   franchisee	   to	   the	  new	   franchisee	   in	  
terms	  of	  the	  agreement.	  If	  one	  accepts	  that	  this	  right	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  business	  
of	   the	   old	   franchisee	   and	  will	   form	  part	   of	   the	   business	   of	   the	   new	   franchisee	  
then	  clearly	  there	  has	  been	  a	  transfer	  of	  a	  part	  of	  a	  business.	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This	   situation	   must	   be	   distinguished	   from	   the	   instance	   where	   the	   franchise	  
agreement	   is	   concluded	   for	   the	   first	   time.	   In	   this	   instance	   there	   is	   still	   the	  
agreement	   between	   the	   franchisor	   and	   franchisee	   in	   terms	   of	   which	   the	  
franchisee	  will	  have	   the	  right	   to	  be	  associated	  with	   the	   intellectual	  property	  of	  
the	  franchisor,	  however	  there	  will	  be	  no	  transfer	  of	  a	  business	  or	  part	  thereof.	  In	  
this	   situation	   the	   franchisor	   will	   permit	   the	   franchisee	   to	   use	   its	   intellectual	  
property	   rights	   and	   this	  will	   form	  part	   of	   the	   franchisees	   business.	   Differently	  
though	   the	   franchisor	   will	   not	   be	   divesting	   itself	   of	   a	   part	   of	   its	   business.	  
Subsequent	  to	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  franchise	  agreement	  the	  franchisor	  will	  still	  
be	  vested	  with	  its	  intellectual	  property	  rights.	  	  
	  
It	  would	  have	  just	  expanded	  the	  geographical	  penetration	  of	  it	  business	  model	  by	  
allowing	   a	   franchisee	   to	   replicate	   it.	   As	   stated,	   the	   franchisor	   will	   allow	   a	  
franchisee	   to	   replicate	   its	   business	  model	   in	   order	   to	   increase	   the	   value	   of	   its	  
goodwill.	   It	  must	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	  geographical	   limitations	  may	  be	  placed	  
on	  the	  franchisor	  by	  concluding	  the	  agreement	  in	  as	  much	  as	  the	  franchisor	  may	  
not	   open	   an	   entity	   bearing	   the	   same	   name,	   trade	   and	   service	   marks	   within	   a	  
defined	   area.	   Of	   course,	   this	   will	   depend	   on	   the	   intention	   of	   the	   parties	   as	   is	  
evidenced	   in	   their	   agreement.	   Although	   the	   franchisor	   may	   be	   geographically	  
curtailed	  in	  the	  use	  of	  its	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  in	  such	  an	  instance,	   it	  will	  
not	   be	   divested	   thereof	   so	   as	   to	   constitute	   a	   transfer.150Only	   once	   a	   franchise	  
agreement	  has	  been	  concluded	  and	  thereafter	   terminated	  and	  transferred	  does	  
the	  application	  of	  section	  197	  become	  relevant.	  Section	  197	  further	  requires	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  A	  franchisor	  will	  not	  always	  be	  geographically	  limited	  as	  to	  the	  use	  of	  its	  
intellectual	  property	  rights.	  All	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  agreement	  is	  
structured.	  For	  instance	  in	  the	  Silent	  Pond	  case	  the	  court	  found	  a	  clause	  in	  the	  
agreement	  incapable	  of	  restricting	  the	  franchisor	  in	  the	  use	  of	  its	  intellectual	  
property	  rights.	  A	  master	  franchise	  agreement	  is	  an	  example	  where	  a	  franchisor	  
will	  be	  geographically	  curtailed	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  mentioned	  rights	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	  a	  franchisee	  will	  be	  granted	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  operate	  and	  conclude	  a	  
number	  of	  franchise	  agreement	  within	  a	  specific	  area	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  others.	  
This	  can	  be	  equated	  with	  a	  licensing	  agreement	  of	  certain	  trademarks.	  Where	  a	  
trademark	  owner	  decides	  to	  issue	  a	  licence,	  the	  licencee	  will	  be	  allowed	  to	  use	  
the	  trademark	  for	  a	  specific	  period	  within	  a	  specific	  area.	  The	  agreement	  may	  
also	  provide	  that	  the	  licencee	  will	  have	  the	  exclusive	  or	  nor-­‐exclusive	  right	  to	  use	  
the	  mentioned	  trademark.	  If	  it	  is	  an	  exclusive	  licence	  the	  trademark	  owner	  will	  
be	  limited	  as	  to	  the	  use	  of	  its	  trademark	  for	  the	  duration	  and	  in	  the	  area	  as	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the	   transfer	   take	   place	   between	   the	   old	   and	   new	   employers	   respectively.	  
According	  to	  Landman	  J	  there	  is	  an	  indirect	  transfer	  between	  the	  franchisee	  and	  
the	   franchisor	   in	   their	   capacity	   of	   employers,	  with	   the	   franchisor	   fulfilling	   the	  
role	  as	  a	  conduit.	  	  
	  
His	   foundation	   for	   the	   argument	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   upon	   the	   conclusion	   and	  
termination	   of	   a	   franchise	   agreement	   both	   old	   and	   new	   franchisees	   alike	   are	  
aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  franchisor	  reserves	  the	  right	  to	  transfer	  the	  franchise	  
agreement	   in	   a	   seamless	  manner	   and	   at	   a	   particular	   stage	   in	   the	   relationship.	  
The	   acquiescence	   of	   the	   franchisees	   to	   the	   termination	   and	   transfer	   of	   the	  
agreement	  by	   the	   franchisor	  between	   the	  old	  and	  new	   franchisees	   can	   thus	  be	  
construed	  to	  be	  the	  conduct	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  employer	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  the	  
transfer	  that	  which	  is	  required	  by	  section	  197.	  	  
	  
This	   contention	   is	   agreeable	   specifically	   if	   one	   considers	   that	   upon	   the	  
conclusion	  of	  the	  franchise	  agreement	  the	  franchisee	  will	  be	  made	  aware	  of	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  franchise	  will	  be	  granted	  for	  specific	  period	  and	  that	  the	  agreement	  
is	  subject	  to	  termination.	  By	  entering	  into	  the	  agreement	  the	  franchisee	  accepts	  
that	   the	   franchisor	   may	   terminate	   the	   agreement	   in	   particular	   instances	   and	  
transfer	   it	   to	   new	   or	   other	   franchisees.151When	   the	   new	   agreement	   is	   entered	  
into	  with	   the	   new	   franchisee	   it	   will	   in	   turn	   accept	   the	   rights	   contained	   in	   the	  
agreement	  and	  those	  rights	  will	  therefore	  be	  transferred	  to	  it.152	  
	  
This	   construction	   is	   in	   accord	   with	   that	   provided	   for	   in	   the	  Aviation	  Union	   of	  
South	  Africa	  v	  SA	  Airways	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  decision.153	  As	  stated,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  above-­‐
mentioned	  judgment	  is	  to	  bring	  transfers	  from	  one	  employer	  to	  another	  within	  
the	  purview	  of	   section	  197.154	  Although	   the	   franchise	  was	  not	   transferred	  by	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  Such	  instances	  include	  when	  the	  agreement	  lapses,	  when	  the	  franchisee	  is	  in	  
breach	  of	  the	  agreement	  or	  when	  the	  franchisee	  is	  under-­‐performing	  in	  relation	  
to	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  franchisor.	  
152	  The	  rights	  under	  the	  franchise	  agreement	  will	  revert	  back	  to	  the	  franchisor	  
for	  the	  interim	  period	  in	  which	  a	  new	  franchisee	  is	  sought	  and	  the	  franchisor	  will	  
thereafter	  transfer	  it	  to	  the	  new	  franchisee.	  
153	  Supra	  (n111).	  
154	  As	  stated,	  if	  not	  for	  the	  purposive	  approach	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  section	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franchisee	  to	  another,	  it	  was	  transferred	  from	  one	  franchisee	  to	  another.	  Further	  
support	   for	   the	   viability	   of	   the	   transfer	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
transferor	   need	   not	   be	   the	   owner	   of	   the	   assets	   transferred	   in	   order	   for	   the	  
transfer	  to	  be	  valid.155	  
	  
If	   this	   is	  considered	  together	  with	  the	  dictum	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	   in	  the	  
Aviation	  Union	  of	  South	  Africa	  case	  there	  is	  clear	  support	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  
termination	  of	  a	  franchise	  agreement	  and	  transferral	  thereof	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  
section	  197.	  By	  giving	  effect	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  section	  197	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  stretch	  
the	   meaning	   of	   a	   ‘transfer’	   contained	   in	   section	   197,	   so	   as	   to	   bring	   the	  
termination	  and	  transfer	  of	  the	  franchise	  agreement	  to	  within	  its	  ambit.	  
	  
It	  is	  thus	  submitted	  that	  a	  ‘transfer’	  as	  contemplated	  within	  the	  context	  of	  section	  
197	   had	   occurred.	   This	   conclusion	   is	   drawn	   from	   the	   minority	   judgment	   and	  
jurisprudence	   in	   support	   of	   a	   purposive	   and	   expansive	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
definition	   of	   a	   ‘transfer’.	   The	   fact	   that	   there	   was	   no	   contractual	   relationship	  
between	  the	  old	  and	  new	  franchisees	  would	  not	  derogate	  from	  the	  finding	  that	  a	  
transfer	  had	  occurred.	  	  
	  
The	   jurisprudence	  pertaining	   to	   secti n	  197	  and	   the	  Acquired	  Rights	  Directive	  
does	  not	  require	  a	  contractual	  link	  between	  the	  old	  and	  new	  employers.	  In	  Dines	  
v	  Initial	  Services156	  and	  COSAWU	  v	  Zikhethele	  Trade	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  &	  another157this	  was	  
confirmed.	  	  
	  
The	  majority	  of	  the	  court	  in	  the	  PE	  Pack	  4100	  CC	  case	  held	  that	  franchising	  is	  not	  
capable	  of	  being	  equated	  with	  outsourcing	  because	  a	  franchise	  relationship	  gives	  
rise	  to	  a	  joint	  venture	  between	  the	  franchisor	  and	  the	  franchisee.	  This	  essentially	  
serves	   to	   avert	   a	   finding	   that	   section	   197	   stands	   to	   apply,	   especially	   if	   one	  
considers	   that	   the	   court	   a	   quo	   found	   the	   particular	   case	   comparable	   to	   an	  
outsourcing	  transaction.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155	  Carlito	  Abler	  and	  others	  v	  Sodexho	  MM	  Catering	  Gesselschaft	  GmBH	  supra	  
(n127).	  Landman	  J	  confirmed	  this	  in	  his	  minority	  judgment.	  
156	  Supra	  (n107).	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The	   fact	   that	   a	   franchise	   agreement	   was	   capable	   of	   being	   equated	   with	   an	  
outsourcing	   transaction	   is	   essentially	   what	   led	   the	   court	   a	   quo	   to	   find	   that	  
section	   197	   was	   applicable.	   It	   is	   currently	   contended	   that	   a	   joint	   venture	   is	  
comparable	  to	  a	  franchise	  agreement	  in	  a	  number	  of	  respects.	  A	  joint	  venture	  is	  
defined	  to	  mean:	  
	  
	  “an	   association	   of	   two	   or	   more	   natural	   or	   juridical	   persons	   to	   carry	   on	   as	   co-­‐owners	   an	  
enterprise,	   venture	   or	   operation	   for	   the	   duration	   of	   that	   particular	   transaction	   or	   a	   series	   of	  
transactions	  or	  a	  limited	  time”	  158	  
	  
Contained	  within	  the	  relationship	  is	  the	  objective	  to	  realise	  a	  mutual	  profit.159In	  
order	  to	  further	  the	  objective	  contained	  within	  the	  relationship,	  both	  parties	  will	  
ordinarily	  contribute	  to	  the	  venture	  in	  the	  form	  of	  property,	  services,	  capital	  and	  
so	  on	  and	  so	  forth.160In	  this	  sense	  there	  is	  a	  large	  degree	  of	  similarity	  between	  a	  
franchise	  and	  a	  joint	  venture.	  Both	  of	  the	  business	  entities	  require	  each	  party	  to	  
contribute	  to	  the	  relationship.	  In	  a	  franchise	  agreement	  a	  franchisor	  will	  provide	  
the	   business	   know-­‐how	   and	   intellectual	   property	   rights,	   and	   a	   franchisee	   will	  
provide	  the	  necessary	  capital	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  plug	  its	  independently	  owned	  
business	   into	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   franchisor.	   The	   mutual	   objective	   of	   this	  
relationship	  would	  be	  to	  realise	  a	  profit.	  Franchise	  agreements	  would	  normally	  
be	  structured	  in	  such	  a	  way	  so	  that	  the	  franchisors	  profit	  would	  be	  predicated	  on	  
the	  franchisees	  performance.161In	  this	  regard	  it	  can	  be	  stated	  that	  there	  is	  a	  large	  
degree	   of	   co-­‐operation	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	   actuate	   this	   goal,	   similar	   to	   that	  
required	  for	  a	  successful	  joint	  venture.	  162	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158	  J	  Taubman	  ‘What	  Constitutes	  a	  Joint	  Venture’	  41	  Cornell	  L.Q.	  640	  1955-­‐1956.	  
159	  http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/joint_venture.	  (Accessed	  on	  27	  August	  
2013).	  
160	  As	  is	  the	  case	  with	  the	  conclusion	  of	  a	  franchise	  agreement,	  various	  
considerations	  may	  underpin	  the	  conclusion	  of	  a	  joint	  venture.	  These	  
considerations	  include:	  The	  size	  of	  a	  particular	  project;	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  project	  
requires	  specific	  skills,	  unwillingness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  proprietor	  to	  bear	  the	  risk	  
of	  a	  particular	  transaction.	  
http://www.cidb.org.za/toolkit06/toolkitpages/module5/20supplementaryinfo
rmation/5s14%20pgd2-­‐jv%20edition%201.0.pdf.	  (Accessed	  on	  27	  August	  
2013).	  
161	  The	  extent	  of	  the	  franchisees	  payable	  royalty	  would	  be	  calculated	  as	  a	  
percentage	  of	  the	  franchises	  profits.	  
162	  H	  Botha,	  Reyneke	  J	  International	  Joint	  Ventures	  and	  Multiculturalism:	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Irrespective	  of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  two	  entities	  are	  comparable	   it	  does	  not	  detract	  
from	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  part	  of	  a	  business	  is	  transferred	  when	  a	  franchise	  agreement	  
is	  terminated	  and	  new	  agreement	  concluded	  with	  a	  new	  franchisee.	  	  The	  reason	  
for	   this	   lies	   in	   the	   transfer	  of	   the	  package	   that	   the	   franchisee	  would	  have	  been	  
entitled	   to	   use	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   franchise.	   It	   is	   this	   package	   that	   formed	   a	  
material	   part	   of	   the	   franchisees	   business,	   without	   which	   it	   would	   not	   have	   a	  
business.	   Even	   if	   the	   joint	   venture	   comes	   to	   an	   end	   when	   the	   franchise	  
agreement	   is	   terminated,	   the	   right	   to	   use	   the	   model	   of	   the	   franchisor	   which	  
stood	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  joint	  venture	  will	  just	  be	  extrapolated	  and	  transferred	  to	  
stand	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  new	  joint	  venture	  between	  the	  franchisor	  and	  the	  new	  
franchisee.	  
	  
Viewed	   differently,	   when	   the	   franchise	   was	   granted	   by	   the	   franchisor	   it	  
expanded	  its	  geographical	  market	  penetration	  and	  allowed	  the	  franchisee	  to	  be	  
associated	   with	   it.	   Upon	   the	   termination	   of	   the	   agreement	   the	   franchise	  
remained	   intact	   and	   so	   did	   the	   geographical	   expansion	   of	   its	   intellectual	  
property	  and	  business	  model.	  The	   right	   to	  be	  associated	  with	   the	  geographical	  
expansion	   had	   thus	   been	   transferred	   to	   the	   new	   franchisee	   regardless	   of	  
whether	  the	  core	  assets	  vested	  with	  the	  franchisor.	  
	  
It	  does	  not	  matter	  from	  which	  perspective	  one	  views	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  granting	  of	  
a	   franchise	   the	   result	   remains	   the	   same.	   If	   the	   model	   followed	   by	   Davis	   J	   is	  
followed	   a	   transfer	   occurs	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   right	   that	   forms	   part	   of	   a	  
franchisees	   business	  will	   be	   revoked	   and	   transferred	   to	   a	   new	   franchisee.	   The	  
franchisee	   loses	   the	   right	   to	   plug	   its	   business	   into	   the	   system	  provided	  by	   the	  
franchisor.	   Inversely,	  when	   the	  model	  of	  Landman	   J	   is	   followed	  a	   transfer	   also	  
occurs.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  franchisor	  divests	  itself	  of	  a	  part	  
of	  its	  business	  when	  granting	  a	  franchise.	  Once	  it	  has	  been	  established	  that	  there	  
has	  been	  a	  transfer	  it	  must	  be	  ascertained	  if	  that	  which	  was	  transferred	  was	  in	  
fact	  a	  business	  or	  a	  part	   thereof.	   In	   this	   instance,	   there	  will	  be	  no	   transfer	  of	  a	  
business	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   franchise	   agreement	   is	   incapable	   of	   being	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It	   is	   however	   possible	   to	   contend	   that	   the	   rights	   espoused	   by	   a	   franchise	  
agreement	  are	  capable	  of	  constituting	  a	  part	  of	  a	  business.	  	  
	  
The	  right	  to	  use	  the	  franchisors	  business	  model,	  intellectual	  property	  and	  know-­‐
how	   forms	   a	   great	   part	   of	   the	   business	   of	   a	   franchisee.	   As	   Judges	   Davis	   and	  
Landman	  pointed	  out,	  without	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  rights	  the	  old	  franchisee	  has	  
no	  business.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  assets	  that	  form	  the	  foundation	  to	  the	  franchise	  is	  
incorporeal	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  present	  any	  problems.	  Irrespective	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  part	  of	  the	  business163	  it	  is	  capable	  of	  being	  identified	  and	  separated	  from	  the	  
franchise	  as	  is	  evidenced	  from	  the	  transferral	  of	  the	  franchise	  agreement.	  
	  
As	   stated,	   the	   facts	   of	   each	   particular	   case	  will	   be	   determinative	   of	  whether	   a	  
part	  of	  a	  business	  has	  been	  transferred.	  Franchising	  is	  an	  odd	  shaped	  beast	  that	  
requires	   its	   own	   personal	   structure	   and	   that	   attracts	   its	   own	   peculiar	  
consequences,	  it	  is	  however	  possible	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  jurisprudence	  pertaining	  
to	  outsourcing	  and	  second-­‐generation	  outsourcing.	  In	  the	  Aviation	  Union	  of	  South	  
Africa	  decision	  Jafta	  J	  correctly	  held	  that	  the	  transfer	  of	  a	  mere	  contract	  would	  be	  
insufficient	   to	   constitute	   a	   part	   of	   a	   business.	   In	   such	   an	   instance	   the	   entity	  
entitled	   to	   the	   contract	   and	   the	   rights	   contained	   therein	   would	   still	   have	   its	  
business	  subsequent	  to	  the	  transfer.	  164The	  entity	  entitled	  to	  provide	  the	  service	  
would	  generally	  arrange	   for	   its	  own	  premises,	  employees	  and	   infrastructure	   to	  
provide	   the	   service.165All	   that	  would	   be	   transferred	   is	   the	   contractual	   right	   to	  
provide	  a	  particular	  service.	  
	  
If	   a	   grouping	   of	   assets	  were	   however	   included	   in	   this	   contract	   and	   employees	  
provided	  for	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  services	  it	  would	  be	  likely	  that	  a	  part	  of	  
a	  business	  had	  in	  fact	  been	  transferred.	  This	  succinctly	  illustrates	  the	  difficulties	  
encountered	  when	  it	  has	  to	  be	  ascertained	  if	  a	  business	  or	  part	  thereof	  has	  been	  
transferred.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163	  In	  this	  instance	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  part	  of	  the	  business	  will	  be	  the	  intellectual	  
property	  rights	  mentioned	  earlier.	  
164	  In	   this	   context	   the	   right	   refers	   to	   the	   entitlement	   of	   a	   service	   provider	   to	  
deliver	  a	  service	  or	  provide	  a	  function	  to	  the	  outsourcing	  party.	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What	   is	   currently	   contended	   is	   that	   the	   franchise	   agreement	   containing	   the	  
rights	  of	   the	   franchisee	  goes	   further	  than	  the	  mere	  transfer	  of	  an	  agreement	  to	  
provide	  a	  service.	  Regard	  must	  be	  had	  to	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  transaction	  which	  
includes	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  a	   franchise.	  As	  stated,	   the	  nature	  of	  the	  
franchise	   is	   such	   that	  without	   the	   rights	   contained	   in	   the	   franchise	   agreement	  
the	  old	  franchisee	  would	  have	  no	  business	  subsequent	  to	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  
agreement.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  possible	  to	  draw	  certain	  parallels	  with	  an	  outsourcing	  transaction	  if	  one	  has	  
regard	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  court	  a	  quo	  and	  the	  perspective	  from	  which	  Davis	  J	  
views	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   granting	   of	   a	   franchise.	   If	   one	   equates	   the	   business	  
framework	  of	  the	  franchisor	  with	  the	  entity	  from	  which	  a	  proprietor	  proposes	  to	  
outsource	   a	   part	   of	   its	   business	   the	   following	   is	   apparent:	   The	   franchisor	   is	  
allowing	  a	  franchisee	  to	  plug	  into	  its	  framework	  to	  fulfil	  certain	  functions	  and	  to	  
expand	  the	  existing	  framework	  of	  the	  franchisor.	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  franchisee	  is	  
delivering	  a	  service	  to	  the	  franchisor	  such	  as	  an	  outsourcee	  would	  do	  in	  respect	  
of	   the	   business	   of	   an	   outsourcer.	   It	   is	   somewhat	   fitting	   that	   the	   franchisor	   is	  
equipping	  the	  franchisee	  with	  its	  trade	  and	  service	  marks	  and	  other	  intellectual	  
property	  so	  as	  to	  put	  the	  franchisee	  in	  a	  position	  to	  expand	  the	  business	  network	  
of	   the	   franchisor.	   Without	   the	   necessary	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   the	  
franchisee	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  deliver	  the	  required	  ‘service’	  to	  the	  franchisor.	  	  
	  
If	  one	  accepts	  the	  position	  above,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  franchisor	  is	  not	  
simply	  transferring	  a	  mere	  contractual	  right	  to	  a	  franchisee	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  perform	  
a	   specific	   function.	   The	   franchisor	   is	   transferring	   a	   contractual	   right	   with	   the	  
required	   tools	   in	   order	   for	   the	   franchisee	   to	   fulfil	   it	   function.	   This	   is	   in	   accord	  
with	  the	  judgment	  delivered	  in	  the	  Aviation	  Union	  of	  South	  Africa	  case.	  Even	  if	  he	  
franchisor	   remains	   vested	   with	   the	   core	   assets,	   by	   transferring	   the	   franchise	  
agreement	   it	   is	   transferring	   the	   right	   to	   provide	   a	   specific	   service	   to	   the	  
franchisee	  and	  equipping	  the	  franchisee	  with	  the	  tools	  to	  execute	  its	  obligations.	  
	  
Further,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   draw	   certain	   distinctions	   between	   the	   transfer	   of	   a	  
franchise	   agreement	   and	   an	   agreement	   to	   outsource.	   In	   order	   to	   illustrate	   this	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South	  African	  Airways	  outsourced	  certain	  non-­‐core	  activities	  to	  LGM	  in	  order	  to	  
reduce	   their	   maintenance	   costs.	   In	   terms	   of	   this	   agreement	   particular	   assets	  
were	  sold	  to	  LGM	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  be	  sold	  back	  to	  SA	  Airways	  upon	  the	  
termination	  of	  the	  agreement.	  The	  services	  provided	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  outsourcing	  
agreement	  would	  also	  be	   transferred	  back	   to	  SA	  Airways	  or	  a	  nominated	   third	  
party	   upon	   the	   termination	   of	   the	   agreement.	   Upon	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	  
contract	  the	  employees	  of	  SA	  Airways	  were	  transferred	  to	  LGM.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  transaction	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  the	  services,	  employees	  and	  assets	  were	  
transferred	   clearly	   falls	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	   section	   197	   and	   deserves	   its	  
application.	   If	   section	   197	   is	   to	   be	   applicable	   upon	   the	   termination	   of	   the	  
agreement	  will	  require	  an	  enquiry	  as	  to	  whether	  LGM	  transferred	  a	  business	  or	  
part	   thereof	   to	   SA	   Airways.	   In	   order	   for	   this	   to	   be	   the	   case	   the	   requirements	  
contained	   in	   section	   197	   and	   its	   surrounding	   jurisprudence	  would	   have	   to	   be	  
applied.	  What	   this	   illustrates	   is	   that	  when	  an	  outsourcer	   transfers	  a	  part	  of	   its	  
business	  it	   is	   in	  fact	  divesting	  itself	  of	  a	  part	  of	   its	  business.	  Similarly	  when	  the	  
transferee	   is	   required	   to	   transfer	   the	   outsourced	   business	   back	   to	   the	   original	  
transferor	  it	  will	  be	  divesting	  itself	  of	  a	  part	  of	  its	  business.	  The	  core	  assets	  to	  the	  
business	   will	   be	   transferred	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   the	   transferor	   and	   the	  
transferee.	  
	  
If	   regard	   is	  had	   to	   the	  granting	  of	   a	   franchise	  and	   the	   termination	   thereof	   it	   is	  
clear	   that	   the	   franchisor	   remains	   vested	   at	   all	   times	   with	   the	   intellectual	  
property	   rights	   which	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   franchise.	   However,	   when	   the	  
franchise	  agreement	  is	  terminated	  the	  franchisee	  will	  be	  divested	  of	  a	  part	  of	  its	  
business.	   Thus,	   although	   the	   franchisor	   is	   not	   divesting	   itself	   of	   a	   part	   of	   its	  
business	   when	   granting	   a	   franchise,	   it	   is	   granting	   a	   contractual	   right	   to	   a	  
franchisee	  to	  form	  part	  of	  its	  business	  network.	  Along	  with	  the	  contractual	  right	  
to	  fulfil	  the	  required	  functions	  the	  franchisor	  will	  provide	  the	  franchisee	  with	  the	  
necessary	  assets	  to	  do	  so.	  When	  this	  relationship	  comes	  to	  an	  end	  the	  franchisor	  
will	  be	  divesting	  the	  franchisee	  of	  a	  part	  of	  its	  business.	  The	  franchisee	  will	  be	  no	  
longer	  be	  allowed	  to	  delivered	  the	  service	  that	  it	  was	  entitled	  to	  in	  terms	  of	  the	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There	  is	  an	  overlap	  between	  an	  outsourcing	  transaction	  and	  the	  termination	  and	  
transfer	   of	   a	   franchise	   agreement	   at	   this	   very	   stage.	   When	   the	   outsourcing	  
agreement	  is	  terminated,	  the	  outsourcee	  will	  lose	  the	  right	  to	  deliver	  the	  service	  
that	   it	   was	   required	   to	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   outsourcing	   agreement.	   If	   assets	   were	  
provided	   to	   the	  outsourcee,	   a	   transfer	   in	   terms	  of	   section	  197	  will	  occur	   if	   the	  
outsourcee	   is	  required	  to	  transfer	  the	  assets	  along	  with	  the	  right	  to	  deliver	  the	  
mentioned	   service.	   The	   same	   holds	   true	   for	   the	   termination	   of	   a	   franchise	  
agreement.	   The	   franchisee	   losses	   the	   right	   to	   expand	   the	   network	   of	   the	  
franchisor	  and	  also	  loses	  the	  right	  to	  use	  the	  assets	  required	  to	  do	  so.	  
	  
It	   does	   not	   matter	   from	   which	   perspective	   one	   views	   the	   termination	   and	  
transfer	  of	  a	  franchise	  agreement.	  	  Whether	  one	  equates	  a	  franchise	  with	  a	  joint	  
venture,	   outsourcing	  or	   something	   completely	  different,	   the	   termination	  of	   the	  
agreement	   and	   conclusion	   of	   a	   new	   agreement	   constitutes	   a	   transfer	   as	  
envisaged	  by	  section	  197.	  
	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  requirement	  of	  a	   ‘going	  concern’	  it	  is	  submitted	  that	  when	  a	  
franchise	  agreement	   is	   terminated	  and	   transferred	  a	  part	  of	   a	  business	  will	   be	  
transferred	   as	   a	   going	   concern.	   If	   consideration	   is	   given	   to	   the	   facts	   of	   the	  PE	  
Pack	  41	  CC	  decision	   it	  becomes	  apparent	  why.	  Although	   the	  majority	   judgment	  
did	  not	  pay	  consideration	  to	  this	  requirement,	  it	  was	  dealt	  with	  eloquently	  in	  the	  
minority	  judgment	  and	  judgement	  of	  the	  court	  a	  quo.	  
	  
Subsequent	   to	   the	   termination	   of	   the	   franchise	   agreement	   and	   the	   transfer	  
thereof	   the	   business	   remained	   the	   same.	   It	   is	   possible	   to	   contend	   that	   the	  
business	  remained	  the	  same	  but	  in	  different	  hands.166	  This	  is	  in	  large	  part	  due	  to	  
the	  nature	  of	  a	  franchise.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  franchise	  agreement	  the	  franchisor	  will	  
ensure	   that	   the	   franchise	   owned	   by	   the	   new	   franchisee	   complies	   with	   the	  
business	  model	  of	   the	   franchisor.	  The	   same	   intellectual	  property	   rights	  will	   be	  
used,	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  business	  will	  be	  the	  same	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  
business	  functions	  will	  be	  the	  same.	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Subsequent	   to	   the	   transfer	   the	   clients	   will	   return	   to	   the	   same	   business	   that	  
provides	   the	  same	  service	  and	  that	   is	  dressed	   in	   the	  same	  get-­‐up	  as	  before	   the	  
transfer.	   This	   will	   be	   the	   case	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   franchise	   agreements	   are	  
drafted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  so	  as	  to	  induce	  the	  belief	  on	  the	  part	  of	  customers	  that	  they	  
are	  dealing	  with	  the	  franchisor.167Due	  to	  the	  homogenous	  way	  in	  which	  franchise	  
agreements	   are	   drafted	   and	   structured,	   the	   framework	   into	   which	   the	   new	  
franchisee	  will	  plug	  its	  business	  will	  be	  the	  same	  and	  on	  the	  same	  terms	  as	  that	  
of	   the	   old	   franchisee.	   This	   position	   is	   neatly	   captured	   by	   the	   snapshot	   test	  
applied	  by	  De	  Swardt	  in	  the	  court	  a	  quo.	  
	  
If	   a	   comparison	   is	   made	   between	   the	   judgments	   of	   the	   court	   a	   quo	   and	   the	  
majority	  and	  minority	  judgments	  of	  Davis	  J	  and	  Landman	  J,	  it	  appears	  that	  Davis	  
J	  is	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  the	  underlying	  purpose	  of	  section	  197.	  His	  finding	  that	  the	  
franchisor	   was	   exercising	   a	   mere	   contractual	   right	   is	   evident	   of	   a	   literal	  
interpretation	  of	   section	  197.	   Such	   an	   approach	   is	   not	   advocated	  nor	   required	  
when	   the	   requirements	   of	   section	   197	   stand	   to	   be	   interpreted.	   In	   drawing	   his	  
distinction	  between	  the	  termination	  and	  transfer	  of	  a	  franchise	  agreement	  with	  
an	   outsourcing	   transaction,	   no	   reference	   was	   made	   to	   the	   locus	   classicus	   of	  
NEHAWU	  v	  University	  of	  Cape	  Town.	  The	  failure	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  decision	  in	  which	  
the	  objects	  and	  purpose	  of	  section	  197	  were	  set	  out	  is	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  a	  
narrow	  and	  literal	  approach	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  section	  197.	  
	  
The	  approach	  followed	  by	  South	  African	  courts	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  application	  of	  
section	   197	   has	   been	   largely	   coherent.168	  The	   judgment	   of	   Landman	   J	   and	   De	  
Swardt	  AJ	  accord	  perfectly	  with	  the	  existing	  position,	  especially	  if	  one	  considers	  
that	   De	   Swardt	   AJ	   equated	   the	   transaction	   under	   consideration	   with	   one	   of	  
outsourcing.	   In	   both	   of	   the	   judgments,	   explicit	   reference	   was	   made	   to	   the	  
purposive	   approach	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   followed	   when	   interpreting	   the	  
requirements	   contained	   in	   section	   197.	   Similarly,	   both	   Judges	   based	   their	  
findings	  as	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  section	  197	  on	  the	  NEHAWU	  decision.	  As	  stated,	  this	  
is	  the	  approach	  required	  by	  the	  provisions	  of	  section	  197.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167	  A	  franchisor	  would	  decide	  to	  use	  franchising	  as	  a	  form	  of	  expanding	  its	  
business	  network	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  will	  not	  be	  incurring	  the	  risk	  of	  
default	  by	  a	  location	  or	  store.	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6.	  Conclusion:	  
What	  has	  been	  apparent	  from	  the	  discussion	  throughout	  is	  the	  prevalent	  role	  of	  
the	  courts	  when	  required	  to	  interpret	  the	  provisions	  of	  section	  197.	  This	  role	  has	  
been	   largely	   necessitated	   by	   the	   bare	   nature	   of	   the	   substantive	   requirements	  
found	   in	   section	   197.	   In	   dealing	   with	   this	   lacuna,	   the	   courts	   have	   sought	   for	  
assistance	   in	   the	   underlying	   purpose	   and	   object	   of	   the	   section.	   	   The	  
jurisprudence	   around	   the	   application	   of	   section	   197	   indicates	   that	   the	   courts	  
have	  cast	  the	  net	  wide	  in	  finding	  section	  197	  applicable	  to	  a	  host	  of	  transactions.	  	  
It	  is	  against	  this	  that	  the	  PE	  Pack	  case	  has	  been	  canvassed	  and	  as	  stated,	  found	  to	  
be	  incompatible	  with	  what	  the	  courts	  and	  academics	  have	  found	  to	  be	  the	  ambit	  
of	  section	  197.	  	  
	  
Franchising	   is	  an	  odd	  shaped	  beast	   that	  needs	   to	  be	  addressed	   in	   its	  own	   light	  
and	  context.	  Before	  finding	  that	  a	  transaction	  falls	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  the	  section	  
one	   has	   to	   have	   regard	   to	   its	   substance.	   This	   done	   in	   light	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   a	  
franchise	  it	  seems	  apparent	  that	  a	  transfer	  had	  occurred	  as	  a	  going	  concern.	  
	  
It	   has	  not	   been	   argued	  what	   the	   ambit	   and	  underlying	  purpose	  of	   section	  197	  
should	  be.	  The	  status	  quo	  has	  just	  been	  provided	  so	  as	  to	  scrutinise	  whether	  the	  
approach	  followed	  by	  Davis	  J	  is	  in	  accord	  with	  that.	  As	  stated,	  this	  has	  not	  been	  
the	  case.	  Proponents	  of	  the	  narrow	  approach	  such	  as	  Wallis	  have	  suggested	  that	  
the	  underlying	  purpose	  of	  section	  197	  should	  be	  narrower	  in	  scope	  and	  that	  the	  
ambit	  of	   transactions	  that	  are	  to	   fall	  within	  this	  scope	  should	  be	   lessened.	  This	  
would	   have	   the	   effect	   of	   leaving	   certain	   classes	   of	   employees	   unprotected.	  
Although	  such	  an	  approach	  might	  appear	  to	  fly	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  
right	  to	  fair	  labour	  practices,	  he	  circumvents	  any	  such	  arguments	  by	  holding	  that	  
the	   sections	   other	   than	   197	   in	   the	   Labour	   Relations	   Act	   provide	   sufficient	  
security	  and	  protection	  to	  those	  affected	  employees.	  This	  contention	  will	  obviate	  
the	  courts	  from	  trying	  to	  stretch	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  words	  contained	  in	  section	  
197	  so	  as	  to	  provide	  protection	  to	  affected	  employees.169	  
	  
On	  policy	  reasons	  that	  might	  be	  a	  sound	  argument	  to	  make,	  it	   is	  however	  not	  a	  
view	   accepted	   widely	   by	   the	   courts.	   The	   decision	   of	   Davis	   J	   the	   PE	  Pack	   case	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might	  be	  indicative	  of	  a	  movement	  within	  the	  bench	  that	  section	  197	  should	  be	  
construed	  more	   narrowly.	   If	   a	   comparison	   is	  made	   between	   the	   judgments	   of	  
Davis	   J	   in	   the	  Avian	  Union	  of	   South	  Africa	   and	  PE	  Pack	   cases	   respectively,	   this	  
contention	  appears	  to	  be	  apparent.	  On	  the	  one	  side	  was	  a	  judgment	  calling	  for	  a	  
wide	  and	  robust	  approach	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  requirements	  contained	  in	  
section	  197,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  a	  judgment	  calling	  for	  literal	  interpretation	  of	  its	  
concepts.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  to	  find	  that	  Davis	  J	  contributed	  to	  an	  article	  written	  
by	  Wallis	  wherein	  the	  argument	  was	  made	  that	  section	  197	  should	  be	  construed	  
more	  narrowly.170	  
	  
It	   is	  however	  contended	  that	  a	   large	  amount	  of	   turbulence	  would	  be	  needed	  in	  
order	   to	   stop	   what	   has	   been	   left	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	  NEHAWU	   decision.	   That	  
considered,	   there	   is	   still	   a	   large	  amount	  of	   room	   for	  proponents	  of	   the	  narrow	  
approach	  to	  provide	  their	  input	  in	  order	  to	  effect	  a	  change	  going	  forward.	  In	  that	  
respect	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   legislative	   intervention	   would	   be	   prudent	   in	  
providing	  clarity	  as	  to	  the	  current	  position.	  Clearly	  this	  is	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  tale	  
and	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  jurisprudence	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  to	  be	  expected.	  	  
	  
Leaving	  that	  aside,	  the	  framework	  surrounding	  section	  197	  provides	  clear	  room	  
for	  its	  application	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  franchising	  and	  based	  on	  the	  current	  state	  of	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